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Abstract 
This study analyzed the construction of the concepts “science,” “scientific literacy,” and 
“Indigenous knowledges and ways of knowing” in Science 10, Saskatchewan’s tenth-grade 
school science curriculum guide. The postcolonial discourse analysis revealed several key 
presuppositions of modern Western (Eurocentric) discourses in the curriculum guide. The 
construction of “science” and “scientific literacy” revealed assumptions characteristic of modern 
Western science, while “Indigenous knowledges and ways of knowing” were paradoxically 
constructed as commensurable with but other than “science.” These findings demonstrate that 
Indigenous knowledges and ways of knowing are misunderstood in the curriculum guide. 
Moreover, the research suggests that thematic content may provide a better point of entry for the 
integration of Indigenous knowledges and ways of knowing into mainstream science programs 
than specific knowledge content (which may not necessarily cross cultural borders). This 
indicates the need to reconsider the development of multicultural science curricula across 
culturally diverse borders. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
When I began this work in 2005, the Ministry of Education in Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan 
Learning, was in the midst of a complete renewal of science education curricula for grades six 
through twelve. The first installment of this project was Science 10 (Saskatchewan Learning, 
2005a), after which the junior and senior years science courses were to follow. This curriculum 
renewal is especially significant because it is the first re-write since the province has made 
explicit its commitment to the inclusion of Indigenous knowledges and heritage (what 
Saskatchewan Learning refers to in Science 10 as “Aboriginal content and perspectives,” “Indian 
and Métis content and perspectives,” and “Indigenous knowledge and ways of knowing”) across 
all curricula. 
The commitment is laid out in Saskatchewan Education’s Core Curriculum Components 
and Initiatives document (2000). The Aboriginal Education Provincial Advisory Committee 
explains:  
The Core Curriculum is recognized as a central feature of the provincial education 
system.  It is a curriculum that creates spaces for Aboriginal voices, well beyond the 
Native Studies program. Integrating Aboriginal content and perspectives across the 
curriculum, within all subject areas is the goal for all students. (Saskatchewan Learning, 
2005b, p. 4) 
 
As one of the “broad initiatives that guide the selection of teaching materials, as well as 
instruction, in the classroom” (Saskatchewan Learning, 2000, p. 5), the Core Curriculum (2000) 
reads: 
It is an expectation that Indian and Métis content and perspectives be integrated into all 
programs related to the education of kindergarten to grade 12 students in Saskatchewan, 
whether or not there are Indian and Métis students in a particular classroom. (p. 6) 
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The inclusion of Indian and Métis content and perspectives is therefore regarded by 
Saskatchewan as important for all students.  
 Saskatchewan Learning (2005b) explains more specifically what is meant by the 
inclusion of Indigenous knowledge and ways of learning: “Integrating Aboriginal content and 
perspectives across the curriculum, within all subject areas,” which “is the goal for all students” 
(p. 4), is mainly supported in terms of professional development among teachers as well as 
developing partnerships, resources, and policy with Aboriginal people. Saskatchewan Learning 
addresses the matter of curriculum actualization: “Teachers need support in theirs efforts to 
actualize the curriculum, provide mechanisms for charting progress, develop a comprehensive 
plan for language and culture programs, and to support the development of connections between 
programs in schools, communities, and the work place” (p. 18). Moreover, IKs are not to be 
included as an “add-on,” as the Aboriginal Education Provincial Advisory Committee explains:  
Where schools are mistaken that Aboriginal content and perspectives are a curriculum 
‘add-on’ and not an integrated goal, their understanding needs to be changed. Where 
there is a lack of voice for Aboriginal education leadership, ways to encourage dialogue 
such as around introduction of Aboriginal languages needs to be found. The educational 
community can support the building of teacher confidence by enabling their growth in 
knowledge. Universities are more convinced that Aboriginal content is important in all 
classes and this can build competence and sensitivity for teachers who are destined to 
teach an integrated curriculum. As a beginning point, education faculty and students 
might be “mandated” to take coursework in Aboriginal history and culture while the 
university as a whole could begin its work of incorporating Aboriginal content and 
perspectives into their courses of study. (Saskatchewan Learning, 2005b, p. 18) 
   
While support for the inclusion of Aboriginal content and perspectives has appeared at the level 
of policy, it has yet to manifest at the level of curricula. Clearly this work still needs to be done. 
As the first installment of the first science curricula renewal in the province committed to the 
inclusion of “Aboriginal content and perspectives,” Science 10 could be an important document 
for the future of Aboriginal and multicultural (cross-cultural) education in western Canada. 
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Thesis Problem 
In an effort to analyze the inclusion of Indigenous knowledges within Science 10, this study 
examines how the Science 10 curriculum guide discursively constructs “Indigenous knowledge 
and ways of knowing” in relation to “science” and “scientific literacy.” Thus, the problem this 
study is concerned with is as follows: How does the way in which Science 10 constructs 
“science,” “scientific literacy” and “Indigenous knowledge and ways of knowing” inform the 
inclusion of Indigenous knowledges?  
However, the challenge of integrating Indigenous knowledges and ways of knowing into 
curricula dominated by at least a century of Western content and perspectives is no simple task. 
Indeed, others have discussed the challenges of multicultural approaches to curriculum 
development (Aikenhead, 2001; 2002; Aikenhead & Huntley, 1999; Hadi-Tabassum, 2001; 
Stalney & Brickhouse, 2001). The words of Samina Hadi-Tabassum (2001) reflect the matter of 
multicultural science as it is used in this research:  
In contrast to the mainstream positions toward science, multicultural science promotes 
alternative ways of knowing or epistemologies that approach scientific knowledge from a 
first world and postcolonial framework that critically questions the empirical 
characteristics and ontological premise of Western science in order to emphasize the 
concept “epistemological pluralism.” (p. 187-188)  
 
As she explains, “the idea of multiple views of science and multiple ways of knowing science is 
a concept that describes the complexities of identity and discourse in our postmodern world” 
(188).  
 The focus and methodology of this thesis—a thematic discourse analysis emphasizing 
epistemological pluralism—is inspired by Kieran Egan’s (2009) essay Letting our 
presuppositions think for us. Like Egan, I see the field of curriculum studies, and multicultural 
curriculum studies in particular, as unfortunately more like a marketplace in which people shout 
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their wares, rather than an arena (or better yet, a classroom) where important questions are 
discussed and debated. And, like Egan, I believe that communication fails because of how little 
most curriculum writers seem aware of the presuppositions upon which their claims, beliefs, and 
arguments rest. However, in the case of multicultural curriculum development, I believe that 
communication fails because most curriculum writers lack awareness not just of their 
presuppositions but also (and perhaps more importantly) of the presuppositions upon which 
others’ claims rest. As Marie Battiste and Sa’ke’j Henderson (2000) point out in the specific case 
of Eurocentrism, “Eurocentric legal and political thought has not confronted the problem of 
differing languages and worldviews” (p. 79). Thus the matter of multicultural curriculum 
development demands an awareness of the nature of culturally diverse perspectives. Awareness 
of culturally diverse perspectives, it should be noted, should not translate into the expectation 
that teachers be able to “walk in two worlds” (which few teachers can do), but rather into the 
expectation that teachers be(come) aware of the diversity of worldviews. 
A central premise of this research is that the claims made by modern Western science 
(MWS) and Indigenous knowledges (IKs) are different (and sometimes incommensurable) 
because they rest on different (and sometimes incommensurable) presuppositions. The second 
chapter addresses certain incommensurabilities between MWS and IK to illustrate their diversity. 
While both in themselves are diverse, particularly the range of perspectives, histories, and 
knowledges that comprise Indigenous worldviews, for the purposes of this thesis, the two 
knowledge systems are understood to have in common a scientific nature, that is, a commitment 
to the empirical and rational (as I explain in greater depth in the literature review). Importantly, 
this is not to reduce either knowledge system to merely the “rational” and/or “empirical” with 
respect to their philosophical foundations; rather, it is just one attempt to find common ground 
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upon which to construct multicultural science curricula. For example, the empiricism and 
rationality characteristically employed by MWS can be described as anthropocentric (human-
centred), while the rationality and empiricism characteristic of IKs can be described as ecocentric 
(place-based).  As such, the discourse analysis (DA) examines the discursive construction of 
“Aboriginal content and perspectives” in relation to “science” and “scientific literacy” in terms 
of the claims made and the (philosophical) presuppositions upon which those claims rest. 
The intention of this analysis is to understand how the discursive construction of each of 
the above concepts informs, supports, or inhibits the possibility of a multicultural school science 
curriculum guide. Put differently, this research examines the relationship between Science 10 and 
cognitive imperialism: “Cognitive imperialism, also known as cultural racism, is the imposition 
of one worldview on a people who have an alternative worldview, with the implication that the 
imposed worldview is superior to the alternative worldview” (Battiste, 2000, p. 192). Given the 
fact that Saskatchewan’s secondary school student population includes a diversity of both 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal students, the question becomes, How does Science 10 construct 
“science,” “scientific literacy,” and “Indigenous knowledge and ways of knowing” in relation to 
the broad worldviews of modern Western (MW; also Euro-American) knowledge and 
Indigenous knowledges, and is there a continued implication that the former worldview is 
superior to the latter? 
 I am interested in this question in order to help teachers and curriculum writers better 
understand the barriers and bridges inherent to the concept of multicultural science so that we 
can better develop multicultural school science curricula. Insofar as it identifies itself as a 
“multicultural” document, Science 10 provides an excellent opportunity to assess the state of 
multicultural (science) curricula development in the internal neocolonial context of 
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Saskatchewan, Canada. Accordingly, is Science 10 ethnocentric or culturally inclusive? Because 
Science 10 represents a first step in the transition from an ethnocentric to a multicultural 
approach to school science, it may be relevant to the assessment and therefore development of 
multicultural curricula in other neocolonial contexts. The relevance of this work to other contexts 
demands that I acknowledge the limitations of this research. 
 Perhaps the most obvious limitation of this research has to do with the fact that the 
analysis examines only one curriculum guide, and so any generalizations that emerge from this 
research are the product of a single DA. As the methodology explains, there are relatively few 
examples of DA in the field of education, particularly in relation to curriculum documents and 
development. The DA itself is limited in terms of its linguistic analysis; instead, as in the 
continental tradition of DA, there is a poststructural emphasis on culture. 
 These limitations point to the need for further research into the possibilities of DA in the 
field of education, in general, and in relation to curriculum development, in particular. A 
complimentary study, for example, might conduct interviews with the writers, teachers, 
professors, etc. involved in the process of multicultural science curriculum development. How 
might the assumptions identified in Science 10 be shared or opposed by those involved in 
curriculum development? In other words, could the process of identifying the assumptions that 
underlie curriculum development (as I do with the analysis of Science 10) facilitate future 
curriculum development across (sub)culturally diverse borders? Furthermore, given the cultural 
basis of languages, (how) could DA be relevant and/or useful in the analysis of authentically 
multicultural curricula?  
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 Given the above mentioned limitations, the following two narratives from my personal 
experience have been included to add depth to my analysis of the data emerging from the DA of 
Science 10. 
Two Narratives Demonstrating the Inclusion of “Aboriginal Content and Perspectives” in 
Curriculum Development 
During my research, I was fortunate enough to be invited to sit as a member on a reference 
committee concerned with integrating Aboriginal content and perspectives in the soon-to-be 
piloted school science curricula for grades 6 to 9. The vetting committee consisted of teachers, 
academics, Elders, and one graduate student who were invited because of their involvement in 
the growing “field” of “Indigenous Knowledge.”1 My involvement in the vetting process resulted 
from the focus of this research, as well as work I have done for research projects concerning IK, 
one examining diverse Aboriginal education systems and learning for the Aboriginal Education 
Research Centre (AERC), and Learning Indigenous science from place (2008), a collaborative 
effort funded by the Canadian Council on Learning and headed by the First Nations University 
of Canada and AERC. 
 One of the first things we learned about our participation in the vetting process was that 
the learning objectives of the curricula were already determined—a reality for which few of us 
were prepared. On our meeting day, our job was to identify possible IK “indicators” for the 
already-determined MWS-based learning objectives. We were asked to identify indicators 
consistent with IK for such phenomena as cell division and mitosis, modern atomic theory, 
electromagnetic technologies, as well as the characteristics of series and parallel circuits, to name 
just a few. In a very short amount of time, it became apparent that the person/s responsible for 
                                                
1 Here, I designate IK as a “field” to draw attention to the increased interest it has received in 
postsecondary and research institutions and academic literature. 
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determining the objectives of the curricula—the person/s responsible for integrating the two 
ethnosciences—knew little to nothing of IK.  
 As the supposed experts of IK, in only a few short hours, we were expected to translate 
specific learning objectives derived from an exclusively modern Western scientific paradigm 
into Indigenous equivalents. It should be noted that while several objectives may have been 
relevant to an Indigenous context, it is inappropriate to assume that MWS translates into IK. 
 In another instance, I was approached by a high school science teacher involved in 
developing curricular resources concerning the inclusion of “Aboriginal content and 
perspectives” in Science 10. After asking me the focus of my thesis (to which I replied, 
“Analyzing the inclusion of Aboriginal content and perspectives in Science 10”), the teacher 
said, “Oh yeah, we did that.” More specifically, s/he was referring to a resource guide that adapts 
the objectives of Science 10 to the “the Snake Game.” The teacher then said, “After learning the 
science, students can apply it [the science] to the Snake Game.” Again, the principles of MWS 
are assumed to cross cultural borders and be not just applicable but relevant to Indigenous 
contexts. In this case, the objectives of Science 10 are assumed to be relevant to the Snake game. 
(The proportion of Indigenous societies that played the Snake Game is altogether another 
matter.) 
In both cases, Indigenous knowledges (“Aboriginal content and perspectives”) are 
included (or allowed to be included) to the extent that they reflect the objectives of the curricula 
(which at first glance appear to be constructed according to the theory of MWS). The assumption 
that the inclusion of Aboriginal content and perspectives can be achieved in the application of 
MWS to Indigenous contexts intimates that Indigenous knowledges and philosophies are 
misunderstood. 
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The rest of the chapters in this thesis can be summarized as follows. The second chapter 
addresses the literature relevant to the problem of multicultural school science curriculum 
development. The third chapter explains the methodology of this research, including my 
approach to DA and the criteria for curriculum evaluation. The fourth chapter focuses on the 
findings from my analysis of the inclusion of IK in Science 10. Lastly, the fifth chapter 
highlights key findings and my recommendations for the development of multicultural (cross-
cultural) school science curricula in Canada. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The issue with which this thesis is concerned is the inclusion of Indigenous knowledges in 
Science 10. The problem situation of the thesis occurs at the cross-cultural intersection of the 
traditional discipline of academic science and the burgeoning field of multicultural science in 
relation to curriculum development in Saskatchewan, Canada. The intention of this section is to 
introduce the reader to the tensions inherent to crossing cultural borders in the process of 
developing and practicing multicultural school science curriculum.  
Altogether, four subsections in this chapter address the key issues involved in 
multicultural school science curriculum development in Saskatchewan. The first subsection 
introduces the reader to the broader context of the problem, namely, the internal neocolonial 
context of the province. The second subsection defines science as multicultural practice in such a 
way that it broadly accommodates both the similarities and differences between modern Western 
science (MWS) and Indigenous knowledges (IKs). The third subsection explores the ideology of 
preprofessional science training—the (modern Western) ideology that produced the first science 
curriculum and that continues to dominate school science today. Lastly, the fourth subsection 
explains the nature of cross-cultural translatability and perhaps its greatest barrier, what Battiste 
and Henderson (2000) refer to as the Eurocentric illusion of benign translatability. 
The Internal Neocolonial Context of Saskatchewan, Canada 
In their article, Toward a decolonizing pedagogy: Social justice reconsidered, Tejeda, Espinoza 
and Gutierrez (2003) describe what many refer to in the United States as an internal neocolonial 
context. Internal neocolonial contexts have their “origins in the mutually reinforcing systems of 
colonial and capitalist domination and exploitation that enslaved Africans and dispossessed 
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indigenous populations throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries” (p. 11). 
Given that all of Turtle Island was colonized into what many refer to as North America 
according to the same European-imperial model, this theorization is equally applicable to 
Saskatchewan, Canada. 
Postcolonial scholars Tejeda, Espinoza, and Gutierrez (2003) explain the internal 
neocolonial context against which they struggle: 
We live in an internal neocolonial condition because we engage in colonial relations of 
domination and exploitation in the production and reproduction of our material existence 
and its cultural expression. […] Our colonial domination and oppression materialize in 
the here and now of the processes and practices of our everyday lives—especially those 
related to securing the basic necessities of life. […] We labor and relate to others in the 
production and reproduction of our social existence with the weight of a colonial and 
imperialist past squarely on our backs. It is within the circumstances inherited from that 
past that we reproduce the condition of our social existence and make our history. We are 
not, however, condemned to continue to making and remaking the condition of our 
existence according to the circumstances imposed by our past. (p. 18) 
 
The authors characterize our contemporary context as colonial “because there continues to be a 
structured relationship of cultural, political, and economic domination and subordination 
between European whites on the one hand, and indigenous and nonwhite peoples on the other.” 
They characterize it as internal “because the colonizing/dominant and colonized/subordinate 
populations coexist, are often socially integrated, and even share citizenship within the same 
national borders.” Lastly, the authors define our context as neo-colonial because they believe “it 
is necessary to distinguish between the forms of domination, oppression, and exploitation of the 
internal colonialism of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries,” on the one hand, 
“and the forms of domination, oppression, and exploitation that have characterized the internal 
colonialism of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries,” on the other (p. 15). Importantly, 
internal neocolonial contexts are maintained not just by material or punitive force but also (and 
perhaps more importantly) by cognitive or ideological force. 
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Though imperialism may have at first been facilitated by militaristic and then economic 
might, it is now facilitated primarily by control over the means of representation. Ashcroft, 
Griffiths, and Tiffin (2000) explain how control of the means of representation confirmed the 
hegemony of modern empires:  
Ultimately, however, it was the control of the means of representation rather than the 
means of production that confirmed the hegemony of the European powers in their 
respective empires. Economic, political and military dominance enabled the 
dissemination of European ideas through the powerful agencies of education and 
publishing. But it was the power of imperial discourse rather than military or economic 
might that confirmed the hegemony of imperialism in the late nineteenth century. (p. 127) 
 
Curriculum represents just one example of a discursive medium through which western 
knowledge systems, and the people that draw upon them, rationalize and normalize the internal 
colonial domination against which Indigenous and nonwhite peoples resist. Building on the 
postcolonial assertion of a direct and material relation between the political and social structures 
of colonialism and Western regimes of knowing and representation, Tejeda, Espinoza, and 
Gutierrez (2003) explain: 
It is an anticolonial and decolonizing theory and praxis that insists that colonial 
domination and its ideological frameworks operate and are reproduced in and through the 
curricular content and design, the instructional practices, the social organization of 
learning, and the forms of evaluation that inexorably sort and label students into enduring 
categories of success and failure of school. (pp. 20-21) 
 
Left unchecked, such systems of knowledge and representation operate in academic contexts 
through concepts such as “history” (see Young, 2004) and “science” (see Harding, 1998; 2006) 
to colonize the mind into a modern (imperial; anthropocentric) worldview. It is for this reason 
that the representation of modern and Indigenous knowledge systems in Science 10 constitutes 
the subject of analysis for this thesis. Accordingly, school science curricula is examined as a 
potential active participant in the re/production of internal neocolonial contexts.  
 13 
The internal neocolonial context of Saskatchewan, Canada, is characterized by a 
hierarchically structured relationship between the colonizing/oppressive European whites, on the 
one hand, and the oppressed/subordinate Indigenous peoples (the descendants of the first humans 
living on Turtle Island) and their descendants, on the other. This relationship is largely informed 
by the education system in Canada. As Battiste (2000) explains, “the educational system, 
fostered by government and society, is the basis of Canadian cultural transmission” (p. 193). 
Drawing on Memmi and Freire, Battiste (2000) describes how modern public schooling, which 
“appears beneficial to all people and intrinsic to the progress and development of modern 
technological society […] has not been benign” (p. 194). She writes: 
Public schooling […] has been used as a means to perpetuate damaging myths about 
Aboriginal cultures, languages, beliefs, and ways of life. It has also established Western 
science as a dominant mode of thought that distrusts diversity and jeopardizes us all as 
we move into the next century. After nearly a century of public schooling for tribal 
peoples in Canada, the most serious problem with the current education system lies not in 
its failure to liberate the human potential among Aboriginal peoples but in its quest to 
limit thought to cognitive imperialistic policies and practices. This quest denies 
Aboriginal people access to and participation in the formulation of government policy, 
constrains the use and development of Aboriginal cultures in schools, and confines 
education to a narrowly scientific view of the world that threatens the global future (p. 
194). 
 
As such, Canadian schools are understood as sites of Eurocentric cultural transmission.  
Citing the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Battiste (2000) explains the 
colonial nature of “the current curriculum in Canada:”  
The 1996 report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples […] explains how 
current educational policy is based on the false assumption of the cultural superiority of 
European worldviews, and […] attests to the need for the transformation of knowledge, 
curriculum, and schools. It recognizes that the current curriculum in Canada projects 
European knowledge as universal, normative, and ideal. It marginalizes or excludes 
Aboriginal cultures, voices, and ways of knowing. (p. 193) 
 
Curriculum is thus understood to play a key role in the transmission of Eurocentric culture in an 
internal neocolonial context. 
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The theorization of Saskatchewan, Canada as an internal neocolonial context is useful for 
two reasons. First, it provides the broader context of more specific problem situation: the 
development of multicultural science curricula in the traditionally monocultural (Eurocentric) 
context of (academic) school science. Second, it lays down the foundation to explain some of the 
incommensurabilities of MWS and IK. 
Multicultural Science in the Internal Neocolonial Context of Canada 
In this section, I define “science” as it is understood in this thesis, that is, as multicultural 
practice. More specifically, the definition of “science” advanced here is intended to 
accommodate the diversity of MWS and IKs without compromising their respective integrity. As 
such, Science 10 is multicultural to the extent that it creates space for both MWS and IK. Indeed, 
Science 10 (2005a) identifies itself as a multicultural document (p. 5). However, the matter of 
defining multicultural science requires that I first (re)define science. 
In an effort to avoid complicity with the imperial character inherent to modern thought, 
knowledge, and language, this section defines “science” as cultural practice in a way that 
maintains the diversity of MWS and IKs. Broadly speaking, this requires interrupting the modern 
western (Eurocentric) systems of knowledge and representation that rationalize and normalize 
the colonization of Indigenous and nonwhite peoples and their knowledge systems. Western 
intellectual traditions typically associate the origins of (modern) science with (i) Greek 
philosophy and its abstract ideas, which radically advanced during (ii) the European Renaissance 
period of the 16th and 17th centuries (Aikenhead, 2006, p. 10). However, as I mean to 
demonstrate in this section, such foundations are not only imperial in their philosophical 
foundations but also historically inaccurate (because they acknowledge only one cultural 
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tradition of knowledge of the natural world). In the instance of this research, I mean to interrupt 
imperial discourse as it occurs in the context of school science (curricula). 
Taking Sandra Harding’s (2006) lead, “following usage in multicultural and postcolonial 
science studies, as well as in the main tendencies in post-Kuhnian history, sociology, and 
ethnography of science,” I use the term science “to mean any systematic empirical study of 
ourselves and the world around us” (p. 10). Harding elaborates: 
A knowledge system or set of inquiry practices will be referred to as a science if it is 
systematic and empirical, regardless of whether it is Western or non-Western, 
contemporary or ancient, obviously embedded in religious or other cultural beliefs or not 
apparently so. (p. 10) 
 
Similarly, Aikenhead (2006) broadly defines “science” as “systematic knowledge of nature” (p. 
7). Addressing its material and ontological dimensions, Ogawa (1995) defines a “science” as “a 
rational perceiving of reality,” where “perceiving means both the action constructing the world 
and the construct of reality” (p. 588). Cajete (2000) offers perhaps “the most inclusive of its 
meanings, that is, as a story of the world and a practiced way of living it” (p. 14). Thus, for the 
purposes of this research, science is defined as any empirical and rational knowledge of and way 
of knowing (and living) in the world. Here, I must reiterate that “empirical” and “rational” are 
not to be limited to their Euro-Western definitions.  
 It is in this respect that I acknowledge the commensurability of MWS and IKs: both types 
of cultural knowledge traditions are scientific in the sense that they are empirical (observation-
based) and rational (systematic; logical), though their respective empiricisms and rationalities are 
grounded in different (incommensurable) worldviews. As such, both knowledge systems are 
capable of arriving at the same truths (though this is not typically the case).  
 Consider the following: if a science is a rational and empirical knowledge of the world, 
then every culture that has ever lived (or lives to this day) must have had (or must have) a 
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science. Food exemplifies this: Insofar as a culture has existed, it must have been able to acquire 
food, and therefore must have possessed a knowledge of nature, or a science. This was (and still 
is) as true of the Indigenous populations of the world as it was (and still is) for imperial societies. 
In other words, this definition of science is inherently multicultural.  
Importantly, however, not all aspects of different sciences are commensurable. Rather, as 
Leroy Little Bear (2000) explains, “different ways of interpreting the world are manifest through 
different cultures, which are often in opposition to one another” (p. 77). Grounding “science” in 
the broader context of culture, Harding (2006) alludes to some of these incommensurabilities: 
Some cultures understand the dangers to health of smoking; others do not. Some 
understand how to manage chronic pain; others do not. Some understand the dangers to 
health of smoking; others do not. Some understand how to manage chronic pain; modern 
biomedicine has not until recently. Some can navigate effectively by the stars from 
Samoa to Australia; others would be totally lost if their global positioning system broke 
down. Some can get people to the moon; others cannot. Some can accurately and 
comprehensively grasp how cultural projects infuse their research practices; others 
cannot. (p. 11) 
 
And I would add that some cultures have survived in their territories for millennia (e.g., 
Indigenous cultures) while others (e.g., modern cultures) have pushed the world to a threshold 
that will trigger runaway climate change if it is exceeded. The point to be made is that “to regard 
all of these different knowledge (or practice) systems as sciences is not to regard them as equally 
accurate, comprehensive, or useful with respect to any particular questions we might ask” 
(Harding, 2006, p. 11). In other words, different cultures’ sciences may be different in ways that 
inhibit understanding across cultural borders, or in ways that are simply incommensurable. An 
example of two such divergent scientific traditions is MWS and IK. Before addressing some of 
these points of divergence, it should be noted that (for the very reason of these 
incommensurabilities) it can be very difficult to approach IKs from a Western worldview. As 
Battiste and Henderson (2000) explain: “Eurocentric structures and methods of logical 
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entailment and causality cannot unravel Indigenous knowledge or its processes of knowing” (p. 
40). 
 Sandra Harding (2006) explains the ethnocentricity inherent in the matter of defining 
“science:” “The term itself is a Western one and can seem to commit yet one more case of 
Eurocentrism when I insist on using it to characterize knowledge systems not so conceptualized 
by their makers” (p. 11). Indigenous knowledges provide countless examples of such “sciences” 
not conceptualized as such by their makers. Aikenhead (2006) addresses the matter of self-
definition with respect to Indigenous knowledges: 
Because an indigenous knowledge system is inseparable from the culture in which it 
evolved, some authors prefer the term indigenous knowledge to indigenous science (e.g., 
Semali & Kincheloe, 1999). The science education research literature, however, often 
identifies these indigenous knowledge systems by such phrases as Native science (Cajete, 
2000), Aboriginal science (Christie, 1991), Mäori science (McKinley, 1996), and Yupiaq 
science (Kawagley, 1995), to name just a few. Each represents one of many indigenous 
sciences. (p. 9) 
 
Aikenhead (2006), himself, “use[s] the term indigenous science because it seems more 
equivalent to the term Western science in the spirit of social inequality” (p. 9). I prefer the term 
Indigenous knowledge to Indigenous science because I focus on the incommensurabilities of 
MWS and IKs. However, in the spirit of equality, I have defined both knowledge systems as 
scientific, that is, as legitimately empirical and rational by virtue of the fact that they work (e.g., 
such knowledge systems contain the knowledge to feed their people). Ultimately, I recognize 
that whichever group holds the knowledge is the group most fit to define and name that 
knowledge.   
 Whether one prefers “Indigenous knowledge,” “Native science,” or other terms, the point 
to be made is that MWS and IKs are not just different, they are at times incommensurable. As 
such, Battiste and Henderson (2000) advise, when approaching IKs from a modern Western 
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(Eurocentric) perspective, “the best way to understand Indigenous knowledge is to be open to 
accepting different realities (however one uses this term)” (p. 40). Heeding this advice, and 
building on the mutually rational and empirical natures of MWS and IKs, in what follows I 
approach the difference between the two knowledge systems as incommensurable in the tradition 
of several scholars of both modern and Indigenous cultures and their respective scientific 
traditions.  
 In his novel Ishmael, Daniel Quinn (1995) distinguishes between two fundamental 
cultural types: Takers and Leavers. The distinction between Takers and Leavers is useful 
because, as Aikenhead notes, “the different knowledges systems of nature held by the Leavers 
and Takers have evolved over the years into 21st-century indigenous sciences and into 21st-
century Western science, respectively” (p. 8). Quinn uses these terms to replace the more 
Eurocentric descriptors civilized and primitive, respectively. Aikenhead (2006) explains:  
Within Neolithic cultures a dramatic innovation appeared in Asia Minor about 10,000 
years ago: The agricultural revolution began. Some groups bought into it, some did not. 
As a result, from that time onward, two fundamentally different types of cultures existed 
in the world. Each had its own stories that interrelated humans, the world, and the gods. 
These culture-based stories persist today in one form or another. (p. 8) 
 
What Quinn finds significant about the distinction between these two cultural2 types are the 
stories3 they enact4:  
For the moment, all you have to know is that two fundamentally different stories have 
been enacted here during the lifetime of man. One began to be enacted here some two or 
three million years ago by the people we’ve agreed to call Leavers and is still being 
enacted by them today, as successfully as ever. The other began to be enacted here some 
ten or twelve thousand years ago by the people we’ve agreed to call Takers, and is 
apparently about to end in catastrophe. (p. 41) 
 
                                                
2 “A culture is a people enacting a story” (Quinn, 1995, p. 41). 
3 “A story is scenario interrelating man, the world, and the gods” (Quinn, 1995, p. 41). 
4 “To enact a story is to live so as to make the story a reality” (Quinn, 1995, p. 41). 
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The catastrophe to which Quinn (1995) refers is the global-environmental disaster that Taker 
culture has been perpetuating since the (modern) agricultural revolution that occurred in the 
Fertile Crescent of the Middle East (Asia Minor). As we now know, this catastrophe is the result 
of unsustainable levels of modern industrial production. By contrast, Indigenous knowledges 
sustained their peoples and their ecosystems until they were interrupted by the event known as 
Contact and the subsequent period of colonization. (And Indigenous knowledges continue to 
sustain their people and their ecosystems were they have not been interrupted by imperialism and 
colonization.) As Cajete (2000) explains, “Native science is a product of a different creative 
journey and a different history than that of Western science” (p. 14). This brings me to the first 
distinction between MWS and IK that I wish to highlight: IKs have more often proven 
themselves sustainable whereas modern sciences have proven themselves unsustainable.  The 
divergent histories of IKs and MWS—as sustainable and unsustainable, respectively—becomes 
more apparent if we identify the two scientific traditions with their guiding stories. (Here, I mean 
to emphasize the storytelling dimension of “science,” as I define it in this thesis, in this case, 
emphasizing Cajete’s (2000) definition of science “as a story of the world and a practiced way of 
living it” (p. 14). Science-as-story is emphasized because I feel it helps elucidate the relationship 
between a culture’s history and its orientation to the world.) 
The Taker story to which Quinn refers is the story of modern progress (i.e., human 
progress). Foundational to the story of modern progress “is the belief that a rational subject can 
truly come to know objective reality and this knowledge can be used to further human progress 
towards, in the words of seventeenth century scientist Francis Bacon, ‘the effecting of all things 
possible’” (Blades, 1997, 17). As Quinn (1995) puts it, the premise of the Taker story is “the 
world was made for man, and man was made to conquer and rule it” (p. 74). This story, as 
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Takers tell it to their children, began approximately ten thousand years ago with the (modern) 
agricultural revolution and intensified during the industrial revolution. For the very reason that 
progress is measured almost exclusively in terms of human progress, I refer to this broad 
orientation as anthropocentric (i.e., human-centred). 
Conversely, the premise of Leaver stories is “man belongs to the world” (p. 240). As 
Quinn observes, “if you take the Leaver premise,” which humans enacted during their first three 
million years of existence, “then creation goes on forever” (p. 240). Cajete (2000) explains how 
Indigenous peoples’ origin stories orient them to place: “Knowing the origins of their people, 
their place, and the all-important things their place contains is considered essential orientation for 
a tribal person. A people’s origin story maps and integrates the key relationships with all aspects 
of the landscape” (74). For this reason, IKs have been referred to as “place-based” (LISP, 2008). 
As such, I refer to IKs as being ecocentric in their orientation. 
 This marks the second notable distinction between MWS and IK: MWS and IK 
demonstrate incommensurable orientations with respect to the natural world. More specifically, 
MWS demonstrates an anthropocentric (human-centred) orientation to the world whereas IK 
demonstrates an ecocentric (place-based) orientation to the world. Endorsing Quinn’s (1995) 
distinction between Takers and Leavers, Aikenhead (2006) summarizes the point:  
The Takers’ cultural stories place humans above nature in hierarchical importance, so 
when Takers live their lives (i.e., when they enact their cultural stories), it is common 
sense for them to take from nature; after all, the world is a human life-support system 
designed to sustain human life. The Leavers’ cultural stories, on the other hand, tend to 
place humans equal to or below nature in hierarchical importance, so when Leavers enact 
their cultural stories, it is common sense for them to leave nature or give back to nature in 
a way that disturbs nature as little as possible; after all, harmony with nature will sustain 
human life. (p. 8) 
 
More succinctly, Battiste and Henderson (2000) observe that “the difference between 
Eurocentric and Indigenous thought lies in the perceived relationship between people and the 
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natural world” (p. 24). These two differently orientations to the world have given rise to two 
parallel knowledges of and ways of knowing the world. 
In the spirit of anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, Knudtson and Suzuki (2001) describe 
the Scientific Mind and the Native Mind as parallel. Quoting Lévi Strauss (in italics), they write: 
In his book The Savage Mind […] Lévi-Strauss completely sidesteps Western society’s 
long-standing tendency to prejudge the Native Mind […] as little more than a spiritually 
stunted cultural antecedent to the nobler, more clear-eyed vision of modern science. 
Rather, Lévi-Strauss refers to the worlds of the shaman and scientist as two parallel 
modes of acquiring knowledge about the universe that have managed to give birth 
independently to two distinct though equally positive sciences. In these two 
fundamentally different modes of thought, nature is accessible to scientific enquiry: one 
[is] roughly adapted to that of perception and the imagination: the other at a remove 
from it. (pp. 8-9) 
 
Aikenhead (2006) elaborates:  
Indigenous sciences are guided by the fact that the physical universe is mysterious but 
can be survived if one uses rational empirical means. Western science is guided by the 
fact that the physical universe is knowable through rational empirical means. Both types 
of knowledge systems are guided by ontological facts, and both rely on empirical 
evidence gathered by experimentation and field studies. (p. 113) 
 
As we can see, though both knowledge systems are empirical and rational, a key difference has 
to do with their respective intentions: MWS is concerned with knowing while IKs are concerned 
with survival.  
 Credited as “the father of science,” Thales (624 BC-546 BC) is generally understood to 
be the first philosopher (in the West) to ask the question: what makes up the world? Since then 
(and quite possibly since before then), MWS and its philosophical antecedents have been 
overwhelmingly concerned with the “stuff” of the world. The modern Western (MW) concern 
with the nature of stuff is largely imperial. For example, in the last few hundred years, “the 
problems that have gotten to count as scientific are those for which expansionist Europe needed 
solutions” (Harding, 2006, p. 43) namely, the conversion of global resources into material 
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wealth. Battiste and Henderson (2000) explain the Eurocentric (modern Western) stance towards 
the pursuit of such knowledge about the world: “In Eurocentric thought […] the world is a 
background against which the mind operates, and knowledge is regarded as information that 
originates outside humanity” (p. 23). As Battiste and Henderson explain:  
In attempting to bridge the gap between humanity and the natural world, European 
philosophers have asserted that something in the Eurocentric mind can “see” facts in the 
raw data of the natural world and can order those facts in ways that reproduce other facts. 
(p. 24) 
 
According to contemporary dominant (MW) discourse, “science” is that something in the MW 
(Eurocentric) mind that allows people to identify facts in and of the world—by virtue of the 
experimental method and the scientific laboratory. Consider, for example, how Canadian legal, 
nutritional, and medical institutions depend almost exclusively on facts (and “facts” derived from 
facts) in order to draw conclusions, and therefore, by extension, depend on MWS. As such, I 
refer to the knowledge of MWS as theoretical or abstract in the sense that it is concerned with the 
idea of the composition of the world.  
 Conversely, IKs can be described as practical, relational, or lived. Cajete (2000) writes 
that IKs are guided by “one of the oldest ecological principles practiced by Indigenous people all 
over the world,” which is, “if you depend upon a place for your livelihood, you have to take care 
of that place or suffer the consequences” (p. 79). As Cajete explains, this was “a lesson learned 
and relearned by many generations over time. As a result of those hard-earned lessons, 
ecological principles have been incorporated as metaphysical as well as practical rules for human 
conduct” (p. 79). IKs are therefore practical in the sense that they are concerned with survival 
(that is, the knowledge to live sustainably). For the sake of comparing the forms of the two 
knowledge systems, IKs could be (crudely) described as being preoccupied with the question of 
how to establish and develop a sustainable lifestyle with the environment from which it emerges. 
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Thus, the third distinction drawn between these two rational and empirical ethnosciences has to 
do with the divergent forms that their respective knowledges take: MWS can be described as 
theoretical, or abstract, whereas IK can be described as practical, or lived (after all, what’s more 
practical than survival?).  
Not surprisingly, the two distinct cultural modes and their respective ethnosciences 
emerge from and reflect two different ontologies, which brings me to the fourth distinction 
between MWS and IK that I wish to address. On the one hand, MWS can be defined, in part, by 
its allegiance to a closed and discontinuous—discrete and dichotomous—binary ontology. On 
the other hand, Indigenous knowledge can be defined by its allegiance to an open and continuous 
ontology. According to Linda Waters (2004), it was this “ontology of binary, or discrete, dualist 
logic” that “operated as the colonial framework that deeply embedded Euro-American thought 
and language, and a Eurocentric perspective about Indigenous people, on the North American 
continent” (p. 97). As Waters (2004) explains, such nonunderstandings (hence 
misunderstandings) persist today: 
Euro-American institutions, including educational institutions, have placed many 
nonunderstandings about Indigenous people into the context of Euro-American-embraced 
conceptual categories. These categories signify a discrete (limited and bounded) binary 
dualist worldview. This worldview continues to operate as a template into which all 
Euro-American interpretations of Indigenous thought and being are recorded […]. 
Moreover, the Euro-American binary system of dualist thought empowered and 
facilitated the misinterpretations of the Indigenous nondiscrete binary dualist worldview; 
many of these misinterpretations remain active in contemporary scholarship. (p. 98) 
 
The dichotomous modern ontology cannot therefore accommodate the “non-discreteness” of 
Indigenous ontologies without first acknowledging that there is some incommensurability.  
 Addressing the ontological incommensurability of MWS and IK from a modern Western 
perspective requires addressing the self-styled universality of MWS. Harding (1998; 2006) 
approaches the assumed universalism of MWS in her unity of science thesis: “According to the 
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unity argument, there is one world, one and only one possible true account of it, and one unique 
science that can capture that one truth most accurately reflecting nature’s own order” (p. 121). 
However, as Harding explains, “less visible in most articulations of the unity thesis is a fourth 
assumption: there is just one group of humans, one cultural model of the ideal human, to whom 
nature’s true order could become evident” (p. 121). This is simply not the case; there are multiple 
interpretations of the world—as many interpretations, I would wager, as there are distinct 
worldviews. To make the point, for example, Indigenous ontologies understand “nature,” 
“culture,” and “science” differently than modern ontologies, which is to say, incommensurably.  
In particular, the divergent ethnosciences’ ontologies can be demonstrated in their 
respective expressions of the relationship between culture and nature (or in the absence of a 
distinction between the two). Sandra Harding explains:  
Deciding which features of humans and the world around us are a consequence of nature 
and which are created by culture has been a controversial issue in the West since the 
emergence of modern sciences. Of course, the issue has far older origins, but modern 
sciences seem to provide compelling evidence of just where the boundary between nature 
and culture is to be found. (p. 7) 
 
The MW assumption of a boundary between nature and culture demonstrates the closed and 
discontinuous ontology of MWS. As Sandra Harding (2006) explains, this distinction does not 
necessarily cross cultural borders: 
To be sure, it has remained unsettling to see that other cultures have defined similar 
boundaries differently—for example, as the raw and the cooked or the domesticated and 
the wild. These contrasting ontologies are by no means restricted to premodern 
knowledge systems; rather, they have shaped modern scientific research in the very same 
fields in which Western scientists study nature. (p. 7) 
 
Indeed, as Battiste and Henderson (2000) explain, “Indigenous peoples do not view humanity as 
separate from the natural world” (p. 24). That is, IKs do not identify “nature” and “culture” 
according to a closed and discontinuous binary ontology (i.e., as separate entities).  
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 I believe the idea of place best represents what I crudely term (for the sake of 
comparison) the collapse of the nature – culture binary. For example, Gregory Cajete (2000) 
demonstrates how “nature,” “culture,” and “science” are collapsed into the concept of place: 
Native science is a story, an explanation of the ways of nature and the sources of 
life, embedded in the guiding stories of a people and the language and way of life 
that convey their stories. Indigenous people are people of place, and the nature of 
place is embedded in their language. The physical, cognitive, and emotional 
orientation of a people is a kind of a map they carry in their heads and transfer 
from generation to generation. This map is multidimensional and reflects the 
spiritual as well as the mythic geography of a people. (p. 74; emphasis added) 
Similarly, Battiste and Henderson (2000) explain that “Indigenous peoples’ worldviews are 
cognitive maps of particular ecosystems” (p. 40). The 2008 Saskatchewan report Learning 
Indigenous science from place explains that the Indigenous concept of place is difficult to 
articulate in Western languages (e.g., English). The report’s literature review identifies five 
aspects important to the concept of place: place is multidimensional, relational, experiential, 
local, and land-based (p. 26 - 30). Quoting Edward S. Casey (in Feld, Stevens, & Basso, 1996), 
the report explains: “Places not only are, they happen” (p. 26). In other words, the Indigenous 
concept of place is better understood as a verb than it is as a noun. This is consistent with 
Battiste and Henderson (2000), who explain that Eurocentric thought and methodologies “derive 
from a noun-centred language system, and they are ineffective in verb-centered Indigenous 
language systems” (p. 40). The point to be made is that modern ontology and the 
dichotomization of nature and culture is incommensurable with Indigenous (i.e., place-based) 
ontology. 
 So far, this subsection has suggested the incommensurability of MWS and IK in terms of 
the two ethnosciences’ divergent histories, politics, epistemologies, and ontologies (as well as 
languages). Indigenous knowledges are more likely to emerge from and reflect a sustainable 
history, an ecocentric political orientation with respect to the natural world, a practice-based 
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epistemology, and an open and continuous ontology. MWS emerges from an unsustainable 
history, an anthropocentric political orientation with respect to the natural world, a theory-based 
epistemology, and a dichotomous binary ontology. To reiterate the point, when approaching IK 
from a modern Western (Eurocentric) perspective, “the best way to understand Indigenous 
knowledge is to be open to accepting different realities (however one uses this term)” (Battiste & 
Henderson, 2000, p. 40). Similarly, in her report on the protection of the heritage of Indigenous 
knowledge, Erica-Irene Daes writes that IK is “a complete knowledge system with its own 
concepts of epistemology, philosophy, and scientific and logical validity” (quoted in Battiste & 
Henderson, 2000, p. 41). In conclusion, I believe that understanding and respecting Indigenous 
knowledge and ways of knowing from a modern Western perspective begins with understanding 
and respecting their differences. 
The Ideology of Preprofessional Science Training and the School Science Curriculum 
This section builds on the previous discussion of the differences between MWS and IK, in order 
to explore how MWS has dominated school science, or in other words, how science has been 
understood and taught in schools. This section explains the present ideological premise of school 
science, namely, the production of little scientist through preprofessional training. As I have 
suggested, a key presupposition of this thesis is that any perspective on school science is 
culturally mediated (ideologically and politically speaking) by being based within a particular 
worldview or worldviews. As Aikenhead (2006) notes, any perspective on school science, 
whether it is humanistic, scientific, or multicultural, conveys an ideological point of view (p. 4). 
Reflecting on “the tension between educational soundness and political reality,” Aikenhead 
advises, “we must never forget that curriculum decisions […] are first and foremost political 
decisions” (p. 4). School science, which “has traditionally attempted to prepare students for the 
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next level of science courses by focusing on intellectual knowledge acquisition,” (p. 1) reflects 
an ideology that favors and privileges MWS. Aikenhead elaborates:  
The traditional science curriculum advocates canonical science content and habits of 
mind (i.e., thinking and believing like a scientist). This scientist-oriented approach 
assumes that “science” in “school science” has the same narrow meaning as it has in, for 
example, “the American Association for the Advancement of Science.” (p. 1) 
 
The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) defines science according 
to the tradition of academic science, which is based in MWS. Furthermore, “science” in 
“scientific literacy” is traditionally assumed to have the same narrow meaning as it has in the 
AAAS.  
Henry Bauer (1992) similarly writes that “widely publicized surveys” of scientific 
literacy “are based on the notion that scientific literacy has three components: the substantive 
concepts within science; the nature of scientific activity; and the role of science in society and 
culture” (p. 2). Furthermore, scientific literacy is often described as the degree to which someone 
is familiar with the general consensus of what the modern Western “scientific community” on 
what are deemed “scientific matters” (Bauer, 1992, p. 2-7). We can therefore say that the 
dominant conception of scientific literacy requires students to acquire the theory, practice, and 
story of MWS (as approached in the previous section). As such, a key premise of the dominant 
conception of scientific literacy is that school science reflects (or can reflect) “real world” 
science (i.e., MWS). 
Aikenhead (2006) directs us to the broader history of school science in an attempt to 
understand the ideology that dominates contemporary school science: 
The ideology of today’s science curriculum is easily understood when placed in the 
historical context of its 19th-century origin, which occurred at a specific time within the 
evolution of science itself. Thus the historical processes and cultural conventions 
responsible for humanistic perspectives in school science are necessarily nested within 
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the history of the science curriculum in general, which itself is nested within the history 
of science in the Western world. (p. 7) 
 
Aikenhead (2006) traces the first school science curriculum to the year 1867 and the British 
Association of the Advancement of Science (BAAS): 
The BAAS approved its “Scientific Education in Schools” report in 1867 (Layton, 1981). 
The BAAS promoted an ideology of “pure science,” serving a self-interest in gaining 
members for the association and in obtaining research funds for those members. […] As a 
result, English education reformers in 1867 produced a science curriculum for secondary 
schools that marginalized practical utility and eschewed utilitarian issues and values 
related to everyday life. Instead this curriculum reflected the BAAS’s newly achieved 
divide between science and technology and, at the same time, it reinforced social-class 
ideologies that favored the elite upper class. (p. 13) 
 
As Aikenhead notes, these ideologies became the status quo for the science curriculum and have 
not changed despite what Ziman (1995) refers to as the “collectivization” of science during the 
20th century into private interest “research and development.” 
 Aikenhead (2006) and others (e.g., DeBoer, 1991; Frederick, 1991; Millar & Osborne, 
1998) refer to this phenomenon or ideology as “the pipeline,” the “ultimate purpose” of which 
“has been to funnel capable students into science and engineering degree programs” (p. 1). The 
pipeline ideology “is an elite scientist-oriented view aimed at marshaling ‘the best and brightest’ 
through the pipeline, an ideology of preprofessional training” (Aikenhead, 2006, p. 4; emphasis 
added). Both elite and non-elite science students are united in the pursuit of “the scientific habit 
of mind” which is assumed to be “the principal benefit resulting from scientific training” 
(Layton, 1981, p. 194; quoted in Aikenhead, 2006, p. 13). The pipeline is rationalized “as serving 
two main purposes” for “non-elite” science students: “their need to understand science well 
enough to appreciate its national importance, and their need to be literate enough to receive 
scientific messages expressed by scientific experts” (Aikenhead, 2006, p. 1). In other words, 
non-elite students are encouraged to learn the theory, practice, and story of MWS so that they 
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may support MWS and its institutions. In practice, this means supporting science research and 
industry as taxpaying consumers, which maintains the hallmark hierarchical dominance (elitism) 
of the Western academy. Thus the pipeline prescribes one of two roles for students on the basis 
of academic merit, either directly as a (MWS) scientist or indirectly as a taxpaying consumer of 
industries that depend on research and development.  
 Most high school students, however, pursue career goals outside the pipeline and so 
training to be a scientist appeals to very few students. As such, most students feel uncomfortable 
in its scientist-oriented focus and, as a result, many students “would prefer a science education 
for everyday life” (Aikenhead, 2006. p. 1). Despite its irrelevance to most students, the ideology 
of preprofessional training will challenge any attempt to reform school science into a subject that 
embraces a humanistic perspective” (Aikenhead, 2006, p. 14), not to mention an Indigenous 
perspective. 
 This alludes to the imperial implications of teaching a scientific habit of mind based on 
the theory, practice, and story of MWS: “The goal of conventional science teaching has been to 
transmit to students knowledge, skills, and values of the scientific community. This content 
conveys a particular Eurocentric world view because science is a subculture of Western (Euro-
American) culture” (Aikenhead & Huntley, 1999, p. 159). Those students who fail to identify 
with a Western (scientific) worldview face a potentially marginalizing cross-cultural experience 
when they study Western science (Aikenhead, 1996, 1997; Aikenhead & Huntley, 1999; Ogawa, 
1995). Furthermore, “to transmit a Western scientific world view to these students amounts to 
cultural assimilation and tends to marginalize and even oppress many students” (Aikenhead & 
Huntley, p. 159). And so it is that the pursuit of “scientific literacy” under the ideology of 
preprofessional science training is a vehicle for modern Western (Eurocentric) cultural 
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assimilation. Here we begin to see the links between school science and the ideology of 
preprofessional science training, on the one hand, and ecological and cultural imperialism, on the 
other.  
Cognitive Imperialism in the Context of Multicultural School Science 
This section addresses what I believe is the greatest barrier to the development of multicultural 
curriculum in the context of school science, what Battiste and Henderson (2000) refer to as the 
Eurocentric illusion of benign translatability. Moreover, the assumption that Eurocentric (MW) 
thought is universally translatable not only confounds the possibility of culturally inclusive 
science programming, but also facilitates cognitive imperialism.  
 Whether or not it is their intention, most attempts to “bridge” MWS and IK result in 
unfair comparisons of the two knowledge systems because the different ethnosciences are 
typically approached from one cultural perspective. In the internal neocolonial context of 
Saskatchewan, and Canada more broadly, that perspective is typically MW (Eurocentric). MW 
(Eurocentric) knowledge systems wrongly assume universal translatability across cultural 
borders and universal relevance to cross-cultural contexts. Battiste and Henderson (2000) refer to 
this as the Eurocentric illusion of benign translatability. As Battiste and Henderson (2000) 
explain, “the illusion of benign translatability has a practical purpose: it maintains the legitimacy 
of the Eurocentric worldview and the illegitimacy of Indigenous worldviews” (Battiste & 
Henderson, 2000, p. 80). It is “a tool of assimilation and power” that “affirms the idea of a 
universal language and worldview, while it conceals the inequalities encoded in the dominant 
language and worldview” (p. 81) as well as in the institutions themselves that have guarded entry 
through the door of progress. In other words, the assumption of cross-cultural translatability 
maintains cognitive imperialism, “the hierarchical and patrimonial monologue that has been 
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created by Eurocentrism. This is often referred to as ‘the Eurocentric monologue’ or as ‘the voice 
of truth,’ as ‘progress,’ and as ‘historical accountability’” (p. 13).  
 In the instance of multicultural curriculum development, the Eurocentric illusion of 
benign translatability occurs in the assumption that MWS (or science constructed in the image of 
MWS) is universal or, put differently, applicable and relevant across culturally diverse borders. 
This occurs when Euro-Canadian curriculum writers are mandated to include IKs but have no 
experience, knowledge, and/or relations with Aboriginal peoples, or seeming tools to address this 
problem. This could be a result of the double standard that requires Indigenous scholars to be 
familiar with modern worldviews, but does not require Euro-Canadian scholars to be familiar 
with Indigenous worldviews. Indeed, “the existing curriculum has given Aboriginal people new 
knowledge to help them participate in Canadian society, but it has not empowered Aboriginal 
identity by promoting an understanding of Aboriginal worldviews, languages, and knowledges” 
(Battiste, 2000, p. 192). Moreover, “most public schools in Canada today do not have coherent 
plans about how teachers and students can know Aboriginal thought and apply it in current 
educational processes” (p. 192). This is not to lay blame with any individual or any organization 
but rather to illustrate the problems inherent to understanding (as it relates to developing) 
multicultural curriculum.  
 The matter of developing culturally inclusive curricula therefore requires that MW 
thought reevaluate the matter of cross-cultural translatability because, as Battiste and Henderson 
(2000) explain, Eurocentric thought may be wrong to assume that culturally diverse worldviews 
are translatable: 
Eurocentric legal and political thought has not confronted the problem of differing 
languages and worldviews. […] The intercultural conflict between worldviews extends 
beyond questions of linguistic relativity and cultural pluralism, however, to the question 
 32 
of translatability. The traditional Eurocentric response is that worldviews can be 
translated. Yet, there are indications that this may not be true. (p. 79) 
 
I believe Battiste and Henderson are correct: modern and Indigenous worldviews are not 
translatable because they are different in ontological and epistemological ways that inhibit full 
understanding across worldviews (i.e., in ways that are or may be incommensurable). For this 
reason, the development of multicultural (science) curricula must create space for the 
development of knowledges about nature, ecologies, and universe, as well as human and social 
encounters, that come from very different ontological and epistemological foundations which 
may not be entirely (or mostly) translatable.  
 In summary, the Eurocentric illusion of benign translatability explains how school 
science advances cognitive imperialism: the assumption of modern scientific universality cannot 
help but construct all other knowledges of the world as inferior by virtue of their inescapable 
differences. 
Literature Review Summary 
To reiterate, the intention of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the tensions inherent to 
multicultural school science curriculum development in the internal neocolonial context of 
Saskatchewan, Canada. These include 1) the broader context of internal neocolonialism, 2) a 
definition of science as (multi) cultural practice, 3) the dominant ideology of school science (the 
ideology of preprofessional science training), and 4) an understanding of cognitive imperialism 
in the context of school science. Perhaps the greatest barrier to authentically multicultural 
education is the ethnocentric assumption that a culture’s knowledge is not only universally 
legitimate but also universally applicable (i.e., across cultural borders).  
 Tejeda, Espinoza, and Gutierrez’ (2003) theorization of our context as internal 
neocolonial is important because it draws attention to the cognitive and ideological forces that 
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sustain the material domination, oppression, and exploitation of Indigenous peoples (e.g., 
curriculum). As Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin (2000) explain, control of the means of 
representation and the re/production of imperial discourse confirmed the hegemony of modern 
empires.  
 Drawing on postcolonial studies of science (Harding, 1998; 2006; Cajete, 2000b; 
Knudtson & Suzuki, 2001) and cultural studies of science and science education (Aikenhead 
2006; Hadi-Tabassum, 2001; Ogawa, 1995), “science” is defined in this thesis as a culturally 
specific empirical and rational (systematic) knowledge of the natural world. Importantly, this 
definition of science acknowledges and accommodates important differences between MWS and 
IK. In this chapter, I examine these two knowledge systems in terms of their divergent histories, 
politics, epistemologies, and ontologies. I suggested that IKs are more likely to support 
sustainable, ecocentric, practical, and inclusive practice, while MWS has tended to support 
practices that are unsustainable, anthropocentric (human-centred), theoretical, and dichotomous. 
Because of these differences, it can be difficult to approach IKs from a modern Western 
(Eurocentric) perspective or worldview. For this reason, understanding IK from a MW 
perspective begins with understanding the important differences between the two ethnosciences. 
 Outdated as it may be, academic MWS provides the dominant model of science for 
school science, that is, as science is practiced in schools (Ziman, 1995). According to this model, 
science is presented as an objective and democratic production of knowledge. However, as 
Harding (2006) points out, the myths of modern Western scientific objectivity and democracy 
are precisely what best serve private (imperial) interests. Aikenhead’s (2006) work is especially 
useful in understanding the dominant ideology of school science as preprofessional science 
training. Building on the insight that any perspective of school science reflects a culturally 
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specific ideology, the ideology of preprofessional science training encourages students to acquire 
the (sub)culture of modern Western science—or the “scientists’ science.” Also known as the 
“pipeline,” the principal aim of this approach to science education is to identify capable students 
and funnel them into science-related programs and careers. Focusing narrowly on academic 
MWS, the ideology of science training operates as a vehicle of modern Western (Eurocentric) 
cultural transmission. 
 Perhaps the greatest barrier to multicultural school science is the ethnocentric assumption 
that MWS is universally legitimate and therefore applicable across cultural borders. In the 
broader context of Eurocentric thought, Battiste and Henderson (2000) refer to this assumption 
as the Eurocentric illusion of benign translatability. As the authors explain, the illusion of benign 
translatability facilitates cognitive imperialism.  
 It is with these considerations in mind that the Science 10 curriculum guide is approached 
and analyzed in this research study, in order to examine the state of multicultural school science 
education in the internal neocolonial context of Saskatchewan, Canada.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter outlines the study’s research methodology and methods in terms of its theoretical 
perspectives, methods of data analysis, and criteria for evaluation. The theoretical perspectives 
that inform the study’s conception of “discourse” and discourse analysis (DA) include 
poststructuralism and postcolonialism. The methodology of research can be described as a 
thematic DA with a primary theme of multiculturalism. The data analysis uses criteria for 
evaluation that centre on the claims made about science, scientific literacy, and IKs, as well as 
the presuppositions upon which they rest, and the culturally specific discourses that inform their 
construction.  
Theoretical Perspectives 
The methodology of this research is informed primarily by postcolonial theory and to a lesser 
degree by poststructural theory. Postcolonial theory, which informs the discourse analysis, 
emerges from poststructural theory, which informs the concept of discourse. 
The conception of discourse as it is used in this research is indebted to French 
poststructural theorist Michel Foucault, whose position is summarized by Ashcroft, Griffiths, and 
Tiffin (2000): 
Discourse, as Foucault theorizes it, is a system of statements within which the world can 
be known. It is the system by which dominant groups in society constitute the field of 
truth by imposing specific knowledges, disciplines and values upon dominated groups. 
As a social formation it works to constitute reality not only for the objects it appears to 
represent, but also for the subjects who form the community on which it depends. (p. 42) 
 
Moreover, there are anonymous rules controlling what can and cannot be said within a given 
discourse and it is these rules that characterize the discourse. The discursive rules concerning 
what can and cannot be said include such things as the classification, ordering, and distribution 
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of knowledge of the world; consequently, it is these rules that inform the analysis of the 
discourse (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2000, 71). In particular, this research is interested in the 
discursive rules that control what is deemed “scientific” in Science 10?  
The DA of Science 10 is grounded in postcolonial theory, which is indebted to 
poststructural theory (Willinsky, 1994; Young, 2004). As Robert Young (2004) explains, 
poststructural theory has been interested in “the relation of the enlightenment, its grand projects 
and universal truth-claims, to the history of European colonialism” (p. 41). Poststructural theory, 
in its various forms, is therefore useful because of the way in which it links enlightenment 
thought (“rationality”) to colonialism. However, “post-colonialism has a far more certain 
intellectual and political agenda,” as it is not “caught up in a poststructural indeterminacy of 
meaning or the resulting collapse of unifying meta-narratives” (Willinsky, 1994, p. 615). 
Postcolonial foci can be described as one particular trajectory for poststructural work because 
postcolonial thought takes the same questions and brings them to the study of colonial and 
postcolonial contexts. Borrowing from Mi’kmaw scholar Marie Battiste (2000), I “use the term 
‘postcolonial’ to describe a symbolic strategy for shaping a desirable future, not an existing 
reality” (p. xix). Such a stance acknowledges “the colonial mentality and structures that still exist 
in all societies and nations and the neocolonial tendencies that resist decolonization in the 
contemporary world” (xix). As such, postcolonial efforts seek to contribute to the decolonization 
of thought and society (and, in this case, school science). 
Postcolonial theories adopt the concept of discourse to examine how modern thought, 
which is understood as “the complex of signs and practices that organize social existence and 
social reproduction within colonial relationships” (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2000, p. 42), 
resists decolonization. Accordingly, the effort to include Aboriginal content and perspectives 
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within Science 10 (and Saskatchewan’s school curricula in general) is recognized as an important 
and necessary decolonizing project. But just how well does Science 10 accommodate Aboriginal 
content and perspectives?  
An examination of the discourses within Science 10 will suggest the degree to which it is 
inclusive and decolonizing and/or the ways in which it may perpetuate colonizing practices 
through the perpetuation of dominant MWS discourses and knowledges. Thus, the definition of 
discourse I employ “contains the question of why certain meanings are experienced as right at 
certain times while others are considered to be wrong, how these meanings considered correct 
are born, and how they come to prevail” (Lehtonen, 2000, p. 42). Based on these definitions and 
considerations of discourse, we can see the object of analysis beginning to take shape: What 
“specific knowledges” about the natural world are sanctioned in Science 10 and how are they 
imposed? How does Science 10 construct what is considered true (and thus false) about the 
natural world? And most importantly to this thesis, do the discourses enacted in and by Science 
10 allow or disallow the inclusion of Indigenous knowledges? 
Since “the intentions of the analyst always guide the theory and method of [discourse 
analysis]” (Rogers, 2004, p. 3), and because the intentions of this analysis are aimed at 
decolonizing curricula, postcolonial theorizing is useful because of its potential to elucidate and 
thus politicize discourse. It is in the spirit of imagining and creating postcolonial societies (and a 
sustainable future) that “we can view the analysis of discourse as a political intervention intended 
to challenge certain discourses, even as it constitutes or reproduces others” (MacKenzie, 2006, p. 
200). DA, however, is a somewhat ambiguous methodology that varies in its methods and 
applications, which requires that I identify the theoretical framework that informs how I intend to 
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use DA. The next section briefly outlines the methodology of DA and locates my specific 
approach within that. 
The Methodology of Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis as a methodology can be broadly understood as having two distinct traditions, 
each associated with a different philosophical heritage. The first, linguistic discourse analysis, 
has roots in Anglo-American linguistics, while the second, poststructural discourse analysis, has 
roots in European (or continental) philosophical and cultural thought (MacLure, 2003).  
Within each theoretical perspective there exists a wide range of approaches to DA. As 
Luke (1995; in MacLure, 2003) explains, one way of distinguishing the two orientations would 
be in terms of a distinction between a “macro” and a “micro” level focus (p. 182). While both 
dimensions are required of DA in general, poststructural DA tends to prioritize the “macro” level 
analyses of social formations and institutions, while linguistics DA tends to favour the “micro” 
level analyses of written and spoken texts. To this end, James Gee is well known for the 
distinction he draws between “big D” and “little d” discourses (see Rogers, 2004; Rogers, 
Malancharuvil-Berkes, Mosley,  Hui, & O’Garro, 2005): “‘Big D’ Discourse refers both to 
language bits and to the cultural models that are associated with Discourses. […] ‘Little d’ 
discourse refers to the linguistic elements—the language bits—that connect with such [big D] 
Discourses” (Rogers, 2005, p. 370). That is, “macro” level analyses are primarily concerned with 
“big D” Discourses, and “micro” level analyses with “little d” discourses.  
While certain understandings may transcend disciplinary boundaries (e.g., linguistic and 
poststructural discourse analysts have appealed to Foucault’s considerations of discourse), 
Rebecca Rogers (2005) is instructive on the matter of D/discourse: “The important thing to keep 
in mind about Discourse (both big and little d) is that they are social and political and have 
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histories of participation that are saturated by power relations” (p. 370). As Marcia McKenzie 
(2006) explains, “the aim of discourse analysis is not to uncover an objective reality, but to 
investigate how we construct objectivity, or sedimented power, through the discursive 
production of meaning” (p. 200). There have been efforts to bridge or transcend the “micro-
macro” divide. For example, critical discourse analysis (CDA), a body of work emanating from 
the linguistic side of the divide, is one such attempt “to marry the ‘bigger picture’ offered by 
social theory with the technical sophistication of linguistic analysis, to produce an integrated 
approach to discourse” (MacLure, 2003, p. 186). CDA has been active in education (see Rogers, 
2004, 2005 for literature reviews). 
 This being “a world of binary antagonisms,” as MacLure (2003, p. 186) notes, 
poststructural analysts criticize linguistic DA “for failing to take account of such aspects of the 
‘bigger picture’ – that is, the political, ideological, cultural and economic dimensions of 
communication” (p. 185). Conversely, linguistic analysts accuse poststructural DA “of lacking 
the linguistic resources for analysing texts and, therefore, of failing to anchor (and therefore 
validate) their descriptions of large-scale discourses with reference to the actualities of talk and 
writing in specific settings” (p. 186). That said, my concern with the linguistic specificities of 
DA lies with its accessibility, which of course depends on the audience as well as the analyst(s). 
In an interview with Kamler (1997), Threadgold (quoted in Rogers, 2004) explains how CDA 
can be problematic as a research methodology in education, given educators’ lack of a linguistic 
background:  
When you do really detailed linguistic work on a text, you disable many of your readers. 
There are lots of readers who need to know about the power of critical discourse analysis, 
but if you do detailed linguistic work it means that only linguists have that text accessible 
to them. (p. xi) 
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Because I do not want to alienate my readers, and because I do not have an extensive linguistic 
background, the DA employed in this thesis takes a poststructural approach. Put differently, I am 
concerned with how “big D” Discourse (macro level discourse) sediments itself in school science 
curricula in the construction of articulations of “science,” “scientific literacy,” and “Indigenous 
knowledges.” 
 While there exists a substantial body of work in education influenced by poststructural 
theory (MacLure, 2003), DA is not especially prolific in the analysis of curricula. Scott Farmer 
(2004) provides one local example in his master’s thesis—a DA of a grade ten history 
curriculum. In the interest of deviating from the linguistic restraints of more linguistically-
oriented forms of DA, I quote Rogers (2004), who explains how thematic analysis constitutes a 
valid form of critical DA in the context of education: 
Approaches to discourse analysis that avoid combining a model of grammatical and 
textual analysis (of whatever sort) with sociopolitical and critical theories of society and 
its institutions are not forms of critical discourse analysis. At the same time, there are 
many, especially in education, who combine aspects of sociopolitical and critical theory 
with rather general (usually thematic) analyses of language not rooted in any particular 
linguistic background or theory. Such work is a form of critical discourse analysis, 
although it may not always be referred to as such. (p. 20) 
 
While “thematic analysis” might seem vague, poststructuralism requires no rigidly defined 
methods of DA. And while the lack of restraints afforded by poststructural analysis facilitates 
this DA, the focus inspired by postcolonial theory motivates it. Thematic analysis thus 
constitutes a “valid” form of DA in the context of education. 
 The primary theme of the analysis is multicultural inclusivity, by which I mean to ask if 
Science 10 is inclusive of different cultures’ knowledges and ways of knowing the world. In the 
literature review, I tried to make two points in particular with respect to the words multicultural 
and science in the context of this research, which are worth repeating at this point for the sake of 
 41 
clarity. First, I explained that science refers to an empirical and rational (logical; systematic) 
knowledge and way of knowing the (natural) world. Thus every culture that has existed has had, 
by the fact of its very existence, the ways of knowing and knowledge needed to survive their 
environment (or world). Second, I explained that multicultural refers to diverse, and sometimes 
incommensurable, culturally specific perspectives on the world (or “ethnosciences,” if you like). 
Many of the presuppositions of MWS and IK, for example, are incommensurable. Building on 
these two foundational assumptions, and drawing upon postcolonial insights and critique, I 
examine Science 10 for its inclusivity of diverse cultural perspectives, particularly Indigenous 
knowledges and ways of knowing. Samina Hadi-Tabassum (2001) is worth repeating, here, on 
the matter of multicultural science as it is used in this research:  
In contrast to the mainstream positions toward science, multicultural science promotes 
alternative ways of knowing or epistemologies that approach scientific knowledge from a 
first world and postcolonial framework that critically questions the empirical 
characteristics and ontological premise of Western science in order to emphasize the 
concept “epistemological pluralism.” (p. 187-188)  
 
In other words, I ask, is Science 10 “epistemologically pluralistic?” 
Focus of Analysis 
The purpose of this research study is not just to address the inclusivity of Science 10, but also to 
identify how the construction of “science,” “scientific literacy,” and “Aboriginal content and 
perspectives” informs the inclusivity of Science 10, in general, and with respect to Indigenous 
knowledges and ways of knowing, in particular. Put differently, How does Science 10 construct 
“science,” “scientific literacy,” and “Aboriginal content and perspectives” in relation to the broad 
worldviews of modern Western (Euro-American) knowledge and Indigenous knowledge, and is 
there a continued implication that the former worldview is superior to alternative worldviews? 
Which ethnoscience/s does Science 10 encourage students to enact? The inclusivity of Science 
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10 will be examined in terms of the claims made about “science,” “scientific literacy,” and 
“Indigenous knowledge” and the presuppositions upon which they rest. 
The methodology for this analysis was also inspired by Kieran Egan’s (2009) essay, 
Letting Our Presuppositions Think for Us. This paper is an attempt to address “how ineffectually 
people typically engaged others’ arguments” (para. 1) in the field of curriculum development. 
Egan’s thesis is that “disagreements about presuppositions are usually the case when it comes to 
arguments or decision-making about the curriculum” (para. 3). As a result, conversations about 
curricula (development) are often rendered meaningless because claims are debated without 
addressing the presuppositions upon which they rest. As Egan (2009) explains, “part of the 
trouble seemed to be how little most writers seemed aware of their presuppositions” (para. 1). 
From my experience with multicultural science curriculum development (explained in two 
narratives in the first chapter), I would add that a large part of the trouble seems to be how little 
most writers seem aware of other cultures’ presuppositions. As previously outlined, Eurocentric 
(modern) thought, for example, often mistakenly assumes its presuppositions to be universally 
applicable.  
Since claims rest upon presuppositions, “it would be an absurd strategy to deal only with 
the claims and ignore the presuppositions, because it may well be that our disagreements are at 
the level of presuppositions” (Egan, 2009, para. 2). The intention of this DA is to tease out the 
presuppositions upon which the claims made of and about “science,” “scientific literacy,” and 
“Aboriginal content and perspectives ” rest in order to identify possible barriers and bridges to 
the development of multicultural science curricula. The most central problem of this research has 
to do with the positioning of Indigenous knowledges with respect to “science.” Addressing this 
problem, however, requires first examining the construction of “science” and, relatedly, 
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“scientific literacy” in the curriculum guide, and then examining how such constructions inform 
the inclusion of IKs in Science 10.  
In conclusion, the focus for the DA is as follows: How do the claims that construct 
“science,” “scientific literacy,” and “Aboriginal content and perspectives,” in Science 10, and the 
presuppositions upon which they rest, inform—support or contradict—the inclusion of 
Indigenous knowledges? 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE INCLUSION OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGES IN 
SCIENCE 10 
This chapter takes up what I identify as the three most fundamental concepts with respect to 
multicultural science in Science 10, namely, “science,” “scientific literacy,” and “Indigenous 
knowledge and ways of knowing” (also in relation to the latter, “Aboriginal content and 
perspectives” and “Indian and Métis content and perspectives”). To reiterate, the intention of the 
analysis is to establish whether or not Science 10 is “multicultural,” by which I mean inclusive of 
Indigenous knowledges (IKs). As mentioned in the methodology, the inclusivity of Science 10 is 
examined in terms of the positioning of IKs relative to the concepts of science and scientific 
literacy. This requires that I first examine the construction of the concepts “science” and 
“scientific literacy” in Science 10. For example, are “science” and “scientific literacy” 
constructed according to ethnocentric or pluralistic definitions?  
 The methodology of the DA involves, first, identifying the claims according to which 
Science 10 constructs each of these three concepts, and, second, examining the philosophical 
assumptions (presuppositions) underlying the construction of each concept. Thus the previous 
question can be revised to read: are the claims (and presuppositions) that construct “science” and 
“scientific literacy” ethnocentric or pluralistic? Because Science 10 is an example of the current 
state of multicultural school science curricula development in the internal neocolonial context of 
Saskatchewan, this analysis hopes to expose some of the barriers and/or bridges—at the levels of 
claim and presupposition—facing the inclusion of IKs within school science programs and 
curricula. All of the quotations in this chapter are taken from the Saskatchewan Ministry of 
Education Science 10 (2005) curriculum guide.  
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Science 10 and the Concept of Science 
Reading over the Science 10 curriculum guide for the first time, one can hardly be blamed for 
thinking that “science” is singular. The language of Science 10 emphasizes the singular tense 
with respect to the various dimensions of science: “the nature of science” (p. 2); “the scope and 
character of science” (p. 3); “the development of science” (p. 3); “the history of science” (p. 3); 
“the focus of science” (p. 3); “the test of science” (p. 3); “the subject matter of science” (p. 3); 
“the role […] of science” (p. 4); “the context of science” (p. 18); “the processes of science” (p. 
20); and “the lens of science” (p. 21). Obviously, multiple sciences cannot have a singular 
nature, scope, character, history, development, etc. The idea of science as singular would appear 
to contradict a commitment to “an inclusive science curriculum,” which, as the curriculum guide 
states, “respects the variety of worldviews that various cultures use to understand and explain 
their relationships with the natural world” (p. 6). As we can see, Science 10 supports the idea of 
many cultural worldviews, and yet of one science. If Science 10 constructs “science” as singular, 
the question then becomes, how does a curriculum guide apparently committed to multicultural 
science construct science as singular?  
The third page of the curriculum guide explains the aim of “science” according to Science 
10: “the focus of science is on the development and verification of knowledge.” Elsewhere, the 
curriculum guide reads, “science deals with the generating and ordering of conceptual 
knowledge” (p. 46); similarly, “scientific knowledge is generated by, and used for, asking 
questions concerning the natural world” (p. 61). To this end, “scientists write to inform, to 
persuade, to reflect, and to construct knowledge claims” (p. 18). The following paragraph from 
Science 10 (about the “Nature of Science and Technology”) explains more thoroughly how the 
curriculum guide understands “science” as “the development and verification of knowledge:” 
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Science provides an ordered way of learning about the nature of things, based on 
observation, and evidence. Through science, we explore our environment, gather 
knowledge, and develop ideas that help us interpret and explain what we see. Scientific 
activity provides a conceptual and theoretical base that is used in predicting, interpreting, 
and explaining natural and technological phenomena. Science is driven by a combination 
of specific knowledge, theory, and experimentation. Science-based ideas are continually 
being tested, modified, and improved as new knowledge and explanations supersede 
existing knowledge and explanations. (p. 3) 
 
As this quote demonstrates, Science 10 constructs “science” as a specific and evolving body of 
knowledge and theory about the natural world (and not, say, as a practiced way of living in the 
natural world). Moreover, science is constructed as the means by which “we” cross the boundary 
separating us from “our environment.” This orientation towards knowledge, as information 
existing in nature (i.e., knowledge as abstract/ed from nature), is characteristic of MWS. The 
following two paragraphs (which have been re-constructed from various Key Concepts in the 
guide) explain the theory and the practice of scientific knowledge production respectively.  
The theory of knowledge production in Science 10 can be summarized as measurement 
oriented toward the end of prediction. As the curriculum guide explains, “science searches for 
cause-effect relationships that enable predictions to be made” (p. 36; p. 76; p. 85). To begin with, 
“scientists use models to represent objects, events, or processes” (p. 33). More specifically, 
“models (physical, mathematical, or conceptual) are simplified representations of real 
phenomena that facilitate a better understanding of some scientific concepts or principles” (p. 
54). Physical, mathematical, and conceptual models thus are understood to represent reality 
quantitatively. The assumption, here, is that “numbers can convey important information in 
science and may be used to express physical relationships in an abstract form” (p. 57). Two 
examples include “the use of scales to represent severity of weather events” (p. 76) and “the 
relative strengths of acids and bases” (p. 71). The predictive power of models, however, is 
limited by uncertainty. While “scientists strive for accuracy in measurements” (p. 79), they 
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recognize that “all measurements are subject to uncertainty based on the limits of the measuring 
device” (p. 52; p. 79). Accounting for the uncertainty, science is understood to be able to 
calculate the probability of an event occurring: “Probability is the relative degree of certainty that 
can be assigned to certain events happening in a specified time interval or within a specific 
sequence of events” (p. 85). In other words, probability measures the predictive power of the 
science in question. Thus, because uncertainty is inherent to science, “science does not make 
absolute predictions such as a weather forecast” (p. 85). As these claims about the theory of 
knowledge production demonstrate, Science 10 makes the assumption that scientific knowledge 
is (mathematically) abstracted from the natural world. Acquiring scientific knowledge, according 
to this scheme, is a matter of measurement.  
The practice of scientific knowledge production in Science 10 is the method by which to 
cross the nature/culture dichotomy and (soundly) acquire knowledge of “the nature of things.” 
According to Science 10, “the laboratory provides an optimal setting for motivating students 
while they experience the natural world through the lens of science” (p. 21). Experiencing the 
natural world, according to Science 10, begins with observation: “scientific knowledge is based 
on observation” (p. 49). Elsewhere, the guide reads: “Observing and describing, using our 
senses, are basic processes of science” (p. 61). Observations are then classified: “Classifying is a 
systematic procedure developed by humans to impose order on collections of objects or events” 
(p. 33). The data collected is then interpreted, which means finding patterns in the data that can 
lead to generalizations about the data (p. 33; p. 52; p. 69; p. 79). Hypotheses are then made based 
on the data: “Hypothesizing is stating a tentative generalization that may explain a large number 
of events and that may be tested experimentally” (p. 54; p. 69). Hypotheses are then tested 
experimentally: “Designing scientific experiments involves planning a series of data-gathering 
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operations that will provide a basis for testing a hypothesis or answering a question” (p. 52; p. 
65). Hypotheses are typically theorized in terms of the effect of one variable on another: 
“Variables are controlled in scientific experiments in order to determine the effect of changing 
one variable on another variable” (p. 52; p. 69). Conclusions are then inferred from the 
generalizations gleaned from research: “inferring is explaining an observation in terms of 
previous experience” (p. 61). The confirmed or rejected hypotheses are then contributed to the 
accumulated body of knowledge produced by science.  
 As the analysis reveals, Science 10 makes several specific claims with respect to the 
intention, theory, and practice of science. Most notably, science is constructed as singular, in the 
sense that it has a single nature, scope, history, theory, practice, etc. More specifically, the claims 
that construct the intention of science argue that scientific knowledge is pursued for its own sake. 
The claims made with respect to the theory of (scientific) knowledge production assert that 
science represents the natural world through cause-effect relationships that are oriented towards 
the end of prediction. The claims made with respect to the practice of (scientific) knowledge 
production reflect the scientific experimental (laboratory) method. Upon closer inspection, 
however, it can be demonstrated that these claims rest upon foundations particular to MWS. 
 To begin with, the claim that the intention of science is to produce (or develop) 
knowledge of the world rests upon the presupposition that science is objective (disinterested). 
This assumption about the nature of scientific knowledge appears to indicate the “discourse of 
objectivity” characteristic of MWS (and MW contexts in general). As the literature review 
explains, all knowledges of the world (most sciences) are suited to some purpose. For example, 
every culture’s scientific knowledge must, at least in part, be practically oriented towards the 
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acquisition and preparation of food and water. Additionally, IKs tend to be specifically oriented 
towards the simultaneous preservation of culture and place. 
 The theory of scientific knowledge production, as it is presented in Science 10, makes the 
claim that scientific knowledge is a representation of “the nature of things.” Relatedly, the 
experimental laboratory science suggests the means by which humans (scientists) access 
knowledge (in nature). According to this story of knowledge production, knowledge exists in 
“nature,” separate from “culture,” and “science” provides the means (vis-à-vis the experimental 
method) by which to access knowledge. The construction of “science” in Science 10 rests upon 
the idea that nature and culture are separate entities and “science” is the means by which to cross 
the boundary separating the natural and cultural worlds. As explained in the literature review, the 
distinction between nature and culture is typical of MWS. Thus we can say that Science 10 draws 
on the theory and practice of experimental MWS, in general, and the discourse of objectivity, in 
particular, in the construction of “science.” 
The point to be made from the analysis, however, is that the construction of “science” in 
Science 10 not only is an outdated and outmoded premise of MWS, but also takes for granted the 
fact that Indigenous ways of knowing produce knowledge differently because they rest upon 
fundamentally different assumptions. In particular, IKs reject the dichotomy of “nature” and 
“culture” because IKs collapse the two concepts into an open and continuous relationship (see 
the literature review). As a result, such a construction of “science” cannot help but marginalize 
those rational and empirical knowledges of the world that do not rest upon the separation of 
culture from nature, as well as a belief in objectivity.  
In summary, the analysis of the construction of the concept of “science” in Science 10 
reveals that the “science” is constructed in the image of MWS through the following claims: the 
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intention of science is to produce knowledge; scientific knowledge represents the natural world; 
scientific knowledge is produced by the experimental method in the laboratory. These claims rest 
upon the assumption of a culture separate from nature and the belief in objectivity; that is, they 
rest upon assumptions specific to MWS. As such, Science 10 constructs “science” in a way that 
is inconsistent (incommensurable) with the concept of multicultural science. 
Science 10 and the Concept of “Scientific Literacy” 
The very first section of Science 10, the “Science Program Philosophy and Purpose,” outlines 
“the purpose of the Science 10 curriculum,” which is “to help all students, regardless of gender 
or cultural background, develop scientific literacy” (p. 1). Scientific literacy is, in other words, 
the focus of the curriculum guide. As such, the concept of scientific literacy regulates what may 
and what may not be granted curricular space in Science 10. The analysis of the construction of 
scientific literacy in Science 10 is organized in terms of the definition and content of scientific 
literacy, two broad categories I have concocted to facilitate the analysis of scientific literacy. The 
analysis of the “definition” of scientific literacy attempts to articulate a framework of sorts for 
the concept of scientific literacy as it is constructed in Science 10; the definition is approached 
first in terms of Science 10’s vision of scientific literacy and second in terms of the curriculum 
guide’s broad organization of scientific literacy. The analysis of the “content” of scientific 
literacy attempts to “fill in” the details of the framework, that is, the ideas of science as they are 
represented in Science 10.  
The Definition of Scientific Literacy 
The analysis of the definition of “scientific literacy” is approached first in terms of its explicit 
construction (i.e., what it is) and second in terms of its more nuanced (and less explicit) 
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construction (i.e., what it is not). The “definition” of scientific literacy attempts to name the 
framework—its vision and organization—into which the inclusion of IKs is attempted. 
The very first page of the curriculum guide provides the definition of scientific literacy in 
Science 10: 
Scientific literacy is an evolving combination of the science-related attitudes, skills, and 
knowledge students need to develop inquiry, problem-solving, and decision-making 
abilities, to become lifelong learners, and to maintain a sense of wonder about the world 
around them. A person who is scientifically literate is able to distinguish science from 
pseudoscience, evidence from propaganda, fact from fiction, knowledge from opinion, 
theory from dogma, and data from myth and folklore. (p. 1) 
 
Not unexpectedly, the definition of “scientific literacy” is closely linked to definition of 
“science” vis-à-vis “science-related” attitudes, skills, and knowledge. As the analysis of 
“science” in Science 10 outlined above, “science” is constructed according to certain MW claims 
about the intention, theory, and practice of science, which rest upon the (MWS) assumption of a 
“culture” distinct from “nature.” 
 Less expectedly, and more interestingly, “science” is also defined in the document in 
terms of its antithesis, “pseudoscience,” which is associated with propaganda, fiction, opinion, 
dogma, myth and folklore. Here, we can see a dichotomous science/pseudoscience 
(science/nonscience) binary system at work in the construction of “scientific literacy” in Science 
10: 
Science   : Pseudoscience 
Evidence   : Propaganda 
Fact    : Fiction  
Knowledge   : Opinion 
Theory    : Dogma 
Data    : Myth and Folklore 
 
In essence, this binary is about credibility: “science” is credible because it is based on evidence, 
fact, etc. (i.e., things that hold up in a court of law, for example, under the rubric of the 
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“reasonable” or “prudent” person); pseudoscience is not credible because it is based on 
propaganda, fiction, etc. (i.e., things that do not hold up in a court of law, for example, third 
party voice with first person interpretation). The significance of such a dichotomous system is 
twofold: first, science is presumed to be either immune to or isolated from propaganda, fiction, 
etc.; second, rational and empirical knowledges of the world that fail to identify with concepts 
like evidence, data, etc. are deemed unscientific. IKs, for example, which tend to identify closely 
with the guiding stories (creation myths) of the cultures to which they belong, would therefore be 
deemed unscientific according to such criteria. It would appear that such a dichotomy runs 
counter to multicultural inclusivity. As we can see, the (MW) idea of objectivity is re-presented 
in the concept “scientific literacy” through the science-pseudoscience dichotomy. 
 The “Language and Communication in Science” section of the curriculum guide 
elaborates on the definition of “literacy” within the concept of scientific literacy:  
In order to understand and use new ideas in science, students need to become literate in 
science. Literacy is “not limited to text…[but] relates to the ability to construe meaning 
in any of the forms used in the culture to create and convey meaning. (p. 17) 
 
However, several of these forms of communication suggest that “scientific literacy” means being 
literate in scientists’ science: 
• “Like scientists, students can learn to vary the formality of their language, especially 
the use of terminology, when addressing diverse audiences, yet to convey their 
message without distorting the science or overstating their claims” (p. 17). 
• “Students in Science 10 should read to be informed, to perform tasks, and to 
understand the experiences and thoughts of others, particularly scientists” (p. 18). 
• “Scientists spend considerable time and effort building and testing models to further 
understanding of the natural world. Similarly, when engaging in the processes of 
science, students are constantly building and testing their own models of 
understanding of the natural world” (p. 20). 
 
Moreover, students are encouraged to explore the role of the scientist/technologist: “Both female 
and male students need encouragement to explore non-traditional, as well as traditional, career 
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options in science and technology related fields” (p. 8). We can therefore say that scientific 
literacy, according to Science 10, encourages students not just to behave and communicate like 
scientists, but also, when possible, to become scientists.  
The vision of scientific literacy in Science 10, outlined and analyzed above, is most 
tangibly organized into four units (consisting altogether of 176 learning objectives) that each 
student must learn. At this point, a brief note on the organization of Science 10 is necessary.  
The broad organization of the Science 10 curriculum guide can be summarized as 
follows: The guide consists of four units in total: “Life Science: Sustainability of Ecosystems” 
(pp. 27-43), “Physical Science: Motion in Our World” (pp. 44-58), “Physical Science: Chemical 
Reactions” (pp. 59-72) and “Earth and Space Science: Weather Dynamics” (pp. 73-89). Each 
unit is made up of five foundational objectives, and each foundational objective consists of 
several learning objectives. As Science 10 explains, “the foundational objectives describe the 
broad learning goals of the unit,” whereas “the learning objectives describe the specific learning 
outcomes that each student should achieve” (p. 25). Altogether there are 176 learning objectives 
(including 21 enrichment learning objectives). The foundational and learning objectives address 
and direct the matter of teaching the Key Concepts of Science 10. The Key Concepts represent 
the main ideas to be learned by someone who is scientifically literate, as defined by the guide 
(that is, in terms of MW scientists’ scientific literacy). Various Key Questions, Pre-Instructional 
Questions, and Suggested Teaching Strategies and Activities support the achievement of the 
objectives (i.e., the learning of the Key Concepts). The objectives therefore appear to constitute 
the focus of the curriculum guide. 
 Other aspects of the guide similarly emphasize the objectives. Consider, for example, the 
relationship between the curricular objectives and the following “broad initiatives that guide the 
 54 
selection of teaching materials, as well as instruction, in the classroom” (p. 5), which includes 
the Adaptive Dimension, Gender Equity, Resource-Based Learning, Career Development, 
Assessment and Evaluation: 
• “It is through the Adaptive Dimension that the classroom teacher accommodates 
individual differences of the members of the class. […] The Adaptive Dimension does 
not allow the changing or elimination of learning or foundational objectives” (p. 6; 
bold in original). 
• “Resource-based instruction is an approach to learning in which students use a variety of 
types of resources to achieve foundational and related learning objectives” (p. 8). 
• “This curriculum guide reflects the career development competencies within learning 
objectives and suggested teaching strategies and activities” (p. 10). 
• “Evaluation should be guided by the intended learning outcomes of the curriculum” (p. 
10). 
• “Foundational objectives form the basis for curriculum assessment and student 
evaluation” (p. 12). 
 
In other words, various broad initiatives may be included so long as they do not compromise the 
foundational and learning objectives. The section titled “Implementing Science 10” (pp 13-22) 
similarly emphasizes the objectives: 
• “Teachers need to engage students in authentic activities that are relevant for their 
students’ current lives while addressing the foundational and learning objectives of 
Science 10” (p. 13). 
• “Decision making regarding instructional strategies requires teachers to focus on […] 
linking ongoing student assessment to learning objectives and processes (p. 13). 
  
Clearly, the foundational and related learning objectives are the structural focus of the 
curriculum guide. 
Each objective, however, is derived from one or more of four Foundational Statements 
for Scientific Literacy. Science 10 explains: “In light of the vision for scientific literacy and the 
need to develop scientifically literate students in Canada, four foundational statements delineate 
the four critical aspects of students’ scientific literacy” (p. 2). These foundational aspects 
include: “Science, technology, society, and the environment” (STSE), “Knowledge”, “Skills,” 
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and “Attitudes.” The four foundations define the dimensions of scientific literacy in Science 10 
and therefore set forth a framework of sorts for scientific literacy. 
To begin with, the first foundation, STSE “is concerned with the scope and character of 
science, its connections to technology, and the social context in which it is developed” (p. 3). 
The roles of science, technology, society, and the environment are taken up in terms of the 
“nature of science and technology,” “relationships between science and technology,” and “social 
and environmental contexts of science and technology” (p. 3). Clearly, science and technology 
are the focus of this story, as it is presented in Science 10. The (almost inseparable) association 
of science with technology is characteristic of MWS, in general. Other elements associated with 
the STSE narrative include “democracy” and “progress.” As the curriculum guide advocates, 
“the potential of science to inform and empower decision making by individuals, communities, 
and society is a central role of scientific literacy in a democratic society” (p. 3). Also, students 
(and teachers) are encouraged to “recognize the contributions of science to the progress of 
civilization” (p. 46). The association of science and scientific literacy with “technology,” 
“democracy,” “progress,” and “civilization” would appear to indicate a MW orientation to this 
story of science. According to the modern cultural narrative, science and technology play 
important roles in the pursuit of progress and civilization (which is defined in the West, in large 
part, by democracy). Indeed, since the time of Thales, modern culture has been preoccupied with 
the question of what makes up the world as well as the belief that this knowledge can further 
human progress towards the effecting of all things possible. 
The second foundation, Knowledge “focuses on the subject matter of science including 
the theories, models, concepts, and principles that are essential to an understanding of each 
science area” (p. 3). The assumption that scientific subject matter be exclusively abstracted (i.e., 
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in the form of theories, models, concepts, and principles) would appear to betray a MW 
conception of scientific knowledge. Science 10 elaborates on the nature of such abstractions: 
“For organizational purposes, this foundation is framed using widely accepted science 
disciplines” (p. 3). The “widely accepted disciplines” refer to the traditional disciplines of 
academic MWS—biology, chemistry, and physics. Indeed, each unit is derived from one such 
discipline: “Sustainability of ecosystems” from biology; “Motion in our world” from physics; 
“Chemical reactions” from chemistry; and “Weather dynamics” from meteorology (a physics 
sub-discipline). In contrast to MWS, IKs fragment neither theory from practice nor knowledge in 
general. The knowledge of science, as Science 10 approaches the concept, is therefore assumed 
to consist of the abstracted knowledge (theories, models, concepts, etc.) of academic MWS.  
The third foundation, Skills, is constructed in a somewhat conflicting way. At a first 
glance, this foundation appears to be “concerned with the skills that students develop in 
answering questions, solving problems and making decisions,” which broadly includes initiating 
and planning, performing and recording, analyzing and interpreting, and communication and 
teamwork (p. 4). However, as Science 10 explains, “while these skills are not unique to science, 
they play an important role in the development of scientific understandings and in the application 
of science and technology to new situations” (p. 4). A closer inspection reveals that this 
foundation addresses the practice of experimental science. To this end, the curriculum guide 
makes clear its position with respect to teaching experimental (laboratory) skills:  
Laboratory work is often at the centre of scientific research. As such, it should also be an 
integral component of school science. […] The inquisitive spirit of science is assimilated 
by students who participate in meaningful laboratory activities. The laboratory is a vital 
environment in which science is experienced. […] Laboratory science is so integral to the 
nature of science that it must be included in every science program for every student. (p. 
21).  
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Following the National Science Teachers Association Science 10 “recommends that a minimum 
of 40 percent of the science instruction time should be spent on laboratory-related activities in 
high school science courses” (p. 21). Clearly, the Skills foundation addresses to the practice of 
MWS, namely, experimental (laboratory) science. 
Lastly, the Attitudes foundation “focuses on encouraging students to develop attitudes 
that support the responsible acquisition and application of scientific and technological 
knowledge to the mutual benefit of self, society, and the environment” (p. 4). This foundation 
includes: appreciation of science, interest in science, scientific inquiry, collaboration, 
stewardship, and safety. The subtlest of all, this foundation reinforces the other three.  
The analysis of the four foundational statements for scientific literacy suggests a 
correspondence with the traditional categories of academic MW “scientific literacy,” that is, the 
theory, practice, and story of MWS (see literature review section, “The Ideology of 
Preprofessional Science Training and the School Science Curriculum”). Knowledge corresponds 
to the theory of MWS; Skills corresponds to the practice of MWS; STSE corresponds to the story 
of MWS; and Attitudes encourages students to enact the knowledge, skills and story of MWS. It 
should also be noted that the Knowledge foundation corresponds with the traditional categories 
of academic MWS—biology, chemistry, and physics.  
 As this subsection demonstrates, Science 10 defines students’ and teachers’ “scientific 
literacy” not only in terms of the science/nonscience binary system, but also in terms of 
scientists’ scientific literacy. The idea that students’ and teachers’ scientific literacy should be 
modeled after (MW) scientists’ scientific literacy implies that Science 10 presumes school 
science can or should imitate scientists’ science.  
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 This appears to implicate the ideology of preprofessional science training in the 
production of Science 10. What is more, if we consider that “science” is constructed according to 
certain MW presuppositions (as demonstrated in the DA of “science”), then the 
science/nonscience binary system cannot help but construct non-MW knowledges of the world as 
pseudoscience or as unscientific.  
The Content of Scientific Literacy 
Whereas the previous section attempted to sketch the framework for scientific literacy (into 
which IKs are to be included) in Science 10, this section attempts to fill in the details of the 
framework—the ideas that the framework contains. Most explicitly, the ideas of science that 
Science 10 (re)presents to its teachers and students can be found in Key Concepts and the 
objectives that support their acquisition. The objectives, which can be thought of as curricular 
directives for teachers, are based on the guide’s Key Concepts, which “provide a broad overview 
of the scientific principles of the unit” (p. 25). More specifically, the Key Concepts serve two 
purposes: “The first is as a guide indicating the suggested depth of coverage of ideas within 
Science 10. The second is to provide teachers with a common set of definitions for important 
concepts within that foundational objective” (p. 25). Thus the Key Concepts (and the objectives 
that support them) constitute the content of scientific literacy—the specific ideas that a 
“scientifically literate” person should possess—what teachers should teach, and what students 
should learn—as it is presented in Science 10. The structural emphasis on the objectives and the 
fact that they are based on the Key Concepts demands that both the objectives and Key Concepts 
be examined more thoroughly. The remainder of this section examines the construction of the 
Key Concepts, the objectives that support them, and their cultural inclusivity. 
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 The Key Concepts can be roughly organized into one of two categories: concepts that 
address the ideas of science, as they are presented in Science 10, and concepts that address the 
story of science, as it is presented in Science 10. The former category constitutes the majority of 
the Key Concepts. Concepts concerning the ideas of science have to do with the definitions, 
theories, principals, etc. of science. Examples include: 
• “An ecological footprint is a measure of an individual’s or a population’s impact on 
the environment” (p. 30). 
• “The slope of a distance-time graph represents the speed of the object” (p. 56). 
• “A catalyst is a substance that changes the rate of a chemical reaction but is not 
changed in the reaction” (p. 69). 
• “An anemometer is a device used to measure wind speed. Typical units are km/h or 
knots” (p. 78). 
 
Concepts that address the story of science include:  
• “Scientific knowledge is a product of human creativity, critical thinking, and 
imagination” (p. 46)  
• “Scientific knowledge is generated by, and used for, asking questions concerning the 
natural world” (p. 61). 
• “The nature of scientific knowledge and the methods of generating scientific 
knowledge is different from other forms of knowledge” (p. 85). 
•  “Science is based on evidence, developed privately by groups or individuals, that is 
shared publicly with others so that they may attempt to establish the validity and 
reliability of the evidence” (p. 88). 
 
The Key Concepts that pertain to story of science as knowledge production have been 
sufficiently reviewed above in the analysis of “science.” This subsection therefore focuses on the 
Key Concepts that pertain to the ideas of science, or its definitions, theories, models, etc. of 
scientific literacy. 
 Science 10 refers to these principles and definitions as “operational.” The “Vocabulary 
and Terminology in Science” section explains the meaning of “operational” as it is used in the 
curriculum guide:  
Students need to recognize that many common words (e.g., force, work, energy, cycle, 
weight, gravity) have specific meaning when used in the context of science. Students 
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should also know that many science terms have operational definitions – that is, the 
definition describes how to measure the phenomena. (p. 18). 
 
The following examples demonstrate in more detail the curriculum guide’s preoccupation with 
measuring and measurement. More specifically, I have included four examples of Key Concepts 
(one from each of the four units in the guide) in order to demonstrate the nature of the Key 
Concepts and their relationship with the learning objectives. (In each case, the Key Concept was 
selected on the basis that it was central to the unit; for example, biodiversity is taken from the 
“Life Science: Sustainability of Ecosystems” unit; the Key Concept speed is taken from 
“Physical Science: Motion in Our World;” chemical reaction from “Physical Science: Chemical 
Reactions; and climate change from “Earth and Space Science: Weather Dynamics.”) 
 Consider, first of all, the Key Concept biodiversity, from the foundational objective 
“Examine biodiversity within local ecosystems” (pp. 32-35). According to Science 10, 
“biodiversity is a measure of the number and variety of a species in an ecosystem” (p. 32). The 
operational definition of biodiversity is supported by the following two learning objectives:  
• “Observe and document a range of organisms to illustrate the biodiversity within a 
local ecosystem;” 
• “Select and use apparatus and materials safely when documenting biodiversity” (p. 
32). 
 
Biodiversity is therefore something to be measured and known through measurement—
observation and documentation. 
 Another example of an operational definition is found in the Key Concept speed, and its 
related Key Concepts, “rate of change,” and “distance,” from the foundational objective 
“Investigate the relationship among distance, time, and speed for objects that undergo uniform 
motion” (p. 51). Science 10 reads: “Speed is the rate of change of distance of an object,” where 
“rate of change is a measure of how fast a quantity changes per unit time” and “distance is the 
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length of path traveled between two points” (pp. 51-52). The following learning objectives 
support the Key Concept speed (and its related Key Concepts): 
• “Collect data about everyday objects that undergo simple linear motion;” 
• “Use appropriate instruments such as ticker timers, stopwatches, photographs, or 
motion detectors to collect data effectively and accurately;” 
• “Construct distance-time graphs to represent the uniform motion of everyday 
objects;” 
• “Explain how the concept of rate of change relates to the concept of speed;” 
• “Operationally define distance and speed” (p. 51). 
 
Similar to biodiversity, speed is something to be known through measurement. 
 A third example is found in the Key Concept, chemical reaction, from the foundational 
objective “Observe common chemical reactions in your world” (pp. 61-63). Science 10 defines a 
chemical reaction as “a process that involves the formation of new substances with new 
properties” (p. 61). Two Key Concepts compliment the Key Concept speed. First, “indicators 
that provide evidence that a chemical reaction might have taken place include: a colour change, 
an odour change, the formation of a new substance (precipitate), the emission of a gas, and the 
release or absorption of heat or light” (p. 61). Second, “energy is lost (released) or gained 
(absorbed) in every chemical reaction” (p. 61). Furthermore, the following learning objectives 
support the acquisition of the Key Concept chemical reaction: 
• “Observe and describe chemical reactions that are important in every day life;”  
• “Perform activities to investigate [energy lost/gained in] chemical reactions;” 
• “Identify indicators that provide evidence that a chemical reaction has taken place” 
(p. 61). 
 
As we can see, chemical reactions are understood to the extent that they can be measured in 
terms of colour change, odour change, presence of a precipitate, energy gained or lost, etc. 
 Lastly, the Key Concept climate change, from the foundational objective “Identify 
consequences of global climate change” is defined as “a change in the ‘average weather’ that a 
given region experiences. Average weather includes all the features we associate with the 
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weather such as temperature, wind patterns, and precipitation” (p. 87). While the practice of 
measuring weather is largely beyond the scope of the school science classroom, the theory of 
measuring weather is not. Accordingly, temperature is understood as “a measure of the average 
speed of molecules” whose “typical units are [degrees Celsius] °C” (p. 78); wind patterns are 
measured in terms of “wind speed,” whose “typical units are m/s, km/h, or knots,” and “wind 
direction” (p. 78); precipitation is measured in terms of “water that falls to the ground in liquid or 
solid form” (p. 82). Like most definitions, climate change is something to be measured. 
 As the analysis of the content of scientific literacy reveals, Science 10 demonstrates a 
preoccupation with measurement as the scientific way of knowing the natural world. Underlying 
this preoccupation with measurement is the assumption that measurement is the basis for 
scientific knowledge. This assumption is grounded in the belief that knowledge can (or should) 
be objective by virtue of its basis in quantitative facts. Most notably, this assumption is particular 
to MWS. The Key Concepts, and the objectives that support them, therefore reflect the 
(operational) theory and principles of MWS. In light of the science/pseudoscience dichotomy, 
the construction of scientific knowledge (and therefore literacy) as based in measurement might 
invalidate those knowledges of the world that fail to demonstrate such a preoccupation with 
measurement. 
In summary, the DA of “scientific literacy” in Science 10 demonstrates that the 
curriculum guide constructs the concept in the image of MWS. As the analysis shows, scientific 
literacy is defined in terms of a dichotomous science/pseudoscience binary, on the one hand, and 
MW scientists’ scientific literacy, on the other. The vision of scientific literacy is set forth 
conceptually in terms of four Foundational Statements for Scientific Literacy. As the analysis 
demonstrates, the four foundations correspond to the traditional categories of academic MW 
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scientific literacy, that is, the theory, practice, and story of MWS (see the third section of the 
literature review). The Knowledge foundation in general and the four units in particular are 
modeled after the traditional categories of academic MWS—biology, chemistry, and physics. 
The analysis of the content of scientific literacy demonstrates a preoccupation with measurement 
and operational definitions—as the scientific way of knowing—which would appear to reiterate 
the suggestion that Science 10 is informed by the discourse of objectivity, in particular, and MW 
discourses of science, in general. Unspoken in this construction of scientific literacy are the 
assumptions that school science can (or should) reflect real world science and that real world 
science is MWS. 
This network of presuppositions regarding the story, theory, practice, etc. of science and 
scientific literacy, constructed in the image of MWS, works in conjunction with the dichotomous 
science/pseudoscience binary to create a framework that (either by definition or by implication) 
positions all non-MW knowledges of the world as unscientific, whether or not they are empirical 
and rational. The following section, which analyzes the construction of IKs in Science 10, 
explores in more detail the effect of such a framework on the inclusion of Indigenous 
knowledges. 
Science 10 and the Concept of “Indigenous Knowledge and Ways of Knowing” 
 As previously mentioned, Science 10 is the first document to emerge from the Saskatchewan 
Learning science curricula renewal process that makes an explicit commitment to the inclusion 
of “Indian and Métis content and perspectives.” To this end, Science 10 reads: “It is an 
expectation that Indian and Métis content and perspectives be integrated into all programs related 
to the education of kindergarten to grade 12 students in Saskatchewan, whether or not there are 
Indian and Métis students in a particular classroom” (p. 6). As Science 10 explains, “this begins 
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with understanding and respecting Indigenous knowledge and ways of knowing. […] An 
inclusive science curriculum respects the variety of worldviews that various cultures use to 
understand and explain their relationships with the natural world” (p. 6). As such, Science 10 
represents the first attempt by Saskatchewan Learning to produce a multicultural school science 
curriculum document. 
This section examines the construction of “Indigenous knowledge and ways of knowing” 
(also “Aboriginal content and perspectives;” “Indian and Métis content and perspectives”) in 
Science 10. The construction of IKs in Science 10 is taken up in two subsections: the first 
subsection details how the curriculum guide employs dichotomous binaries in the construction of 
IKs; the second subsection examines in greater detail how the application of dichotomous 
binaries to IKs informs their inclusion.  
The Construction of Indigenous Knowledges 
The location of the definition of IKs is quite telling: “Indian and Métis content and perspectives” 
is one of several broad initiatives or considerations of “scientific literacy” intended to “guide the 
selection of teaching materials, as well as instruction, in the classroom” (p. 5). Other broad 
initiatives include Multiculturalism, Gender Equity, Resource-based Learning, and Career 
Development. However, as the previous section demonstrates, the broad initiatives of the guide 
are secondary in importance to the objectives, which are dominated by MWS. Two of the five 
facets concerned with “integrating Indian and Métis perspectives into the science program” 
reiterate the point: 
• “This approach capitalizes on the responsibility and authority of teachers to adapt 
instruction in order to be responsive to the interests and needs of their students and 
local communities, while still respecting the foundational and related learning 
objectives” (p. 6; emphasis added).  
• “The creation of cross-cultural units of study […] requires teachers to work 
collaboratively with members of Indian and Métis communities to choose topics and 
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instructional approaches that reflect Indigenous understandings and that also address 
curricular objectives” (p. 7; emphasis added). 
 
Like the other broad initiatives, Indian and Métis content and perspectives may be included 
insofar as they do not compromise the curricular objectives. The point to be made, however, is 
that Science 10 presumes that topics, instructional approaches, and curricular objectives can 
simultaneously reflect modern and Indigenous knowledges. 
Closer inspection, however, reveals the presence of a dichotomy in the simultaneous 
construction of “scientific” and “Indigenous” perspectives. As Science 10 explains, “Indigenous 
knowledge and ways of knowing often seem at odds with contemporary, scientific views of 
knowing. Thus, teachers and students may question why these ways of knowing should be 
incorporated into and addressed in science courses” (p. 6). (Interestingly, “Indian and Métis 
Content and Perspectives” is the only broad initiative whose inclusion is questioned in the 
guide.) The dichotomy to which Science 10 alludes is made clearer in the following passage:  
Indigenous perspectives are holistic, and focus on understanding concepts at a macro 
level, and then looking for specific examples that incorporate that knowledge. Inherent in 
these perspectives is an understanding of the relationships between the living and non-
living, and a need to respect cultural values when exploring nature. Contemporary 
scientific approaches are generally characterized as reductionist, focusing first on the 
micro level of understanding, then progressing to the major macro concepts and 
connections. This dichotomy in worldviews creates a challenge for teachers of classes 
that contain a mix of students of various different heritages. (p. 6) 
 
Furthermore, Science 10 recommends “identifying Indian and Métis contributions towards our 
understanding of the natural world, and equally valuing Indigenous perspectives and 
understandings of the natural world along with scientific perspectives” (p. 7; emphasis added). 
The fact that Science 10 understands IKs and “science” as a “dichotomy in worldviews,” and the 
fact that IKs are constructed as holistic and cultural while scientific perspectives are constructed 
as contemporary and reductionist, implies that IKs are not contemporary (i.e., IKs are primitive) 
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while “science” is accultural (i.e., “science” is objective). IKs are thus positioned as being 
simultaneously other than science and other than ours. This would appear to contradict the 
inclusion of diverse knowledges and ways of knowing. 
Drawing the on the textual data analyzed so far, we can see that IKs are constructed 
according to the following dichotomous binary system (parentheses denote terms of the binary 
that are implied): 
Scientific    : Indigenous 
Contemporary    : (Premodern) 
Reductionist (micro-to-macro) : Holist (macro-to-micro)  
(Accultural)    : Cultural 
Ours     : Theirs 
Civilized    : (Primitive) 
 
More specifically, “Indigenous” is explicitly constructed as theirs, holist, and cultural according 
to the same binary system that constructs “scientific” as ours, civilized, contemporary, and 
reductionist. Implicit in this binary system is the notion (myth) of modern progress. According to 
this binary system, “Indigenous” is implied to be primitive on account of its association with 
culture, while “scientific” is implied to be modern on account of its (assumed) dissociation from 
culture (e.g., demonstrated in the discourse of objectivity). The point to be made with respect to 
this account of IKs is that IKs do not emerge from the same ontological system that MWS does. 
More specifically, the ontological system that organizes the world into closed and distinct 
categorizations, e.g., holistic or reductionist, contemporary or primitive, theirs or ours, etc., is 
inapplicable to IKs and therefore cannot be used to articulate an understanding of IKs. IKs 
emerge from a different ontological system than MWS; these ontologies are described (in the 
literature review) as open and closed. Coupled with the observation that science is constructed in 
the exclusive image of MWS, we can see that this dichotomous binary system operates to reify 
 67 
the terms that normalize the (imperial) notion of progress that defines our internal neocolonial 
context and which marginalizes Indigenous knowledges and ways of knowing.  
In summary, the analysis of the construction of IKs in Science 10 demonstrates that IKs 
are constructed according to a paradox. On the one hand, IKs are constructed as being 
commensurable with MWS, which is demonstrated explicitly in the assumed relevance of the 
MWS-based objectives to Indigenous knowledges and contexts. On the other hand, IKs are 
constructed as being other than science. To begin with, IKs are conspicuously absent from the 
definition, structure, and content of “scientific literacy” (the construction of which, as the 
previous section demonstrates, is based in MWS). Where IKs can be found (i.e., as a broad 
initiative of scientific literacy), the term “Indigenous” is constructed as other than “scientific” 
according to the same dichotomous binary system that constructs “science” as MWS. 
As a result of this paradox, in which IKs are constructed as other than but commensurable 
with MWS, the attempt to include IKs ranges from openly addressing the challenges of its 
inclusion to an articulation of IK as inverted “science.” The assumption of cross-cultural 
commensurability in Science 10, coupled with fact that “science” is constructed in the image of 
MWS, would appear to indicate the Eurocentric illusion of benign translatability, which asserts 
that European (Eurocentric) ideas can cross cultural borders (for example, into Indigenous 
cultural contexts) without substantial damage or distortion. The following subsection explores in 
more detail the application of a dichotomous binary ontology to IKs and its effect on their 
inclusion in Science 10.  
The Misapplication of Dichotomous Binaries to Indigenous Knowledges 
Whereas the previous subsection demonstrated that IKs are constructed according to 
dichotomous binaries, this subsection more thoroughly explores how it is that the guide 
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misapplies the dichotomous binaries to IKs. In particular, this analysis examines how the 
reductionism/holism, living/nonliving, science/culture, and nature/culture dichotomies are 
misapplied to IKs in Science 10.  
 Reductionism/holism. Recall the dichotomous reductionist/holist binary (identified in 
the previous subsection) drawn upon in the simultaneous construction of MWS and IKs: 
“Indigenous perspectives are holistic, and […] contemporary scientific approaches are generally 
characterized as reductionist” (p. 6). In this scheme, holism is understood as the inversion of 
reductionism. Accordingly, Indigenous perspectives “focus on understanding concepts at a 
macro level, and then looking for specific examples that incorporate that knowledge” while 
scientific approaches begin by “focusing first on the micro level of understanding, then 
progressing to the major macro concepts and connections” (p. 6). However, Indigenous 
knowledge and ways of knowing do not begin at the macro level and then incorporate micro 
level examples as the curriculum guide explains (p. 6) because Indigenous perspectives do not 
divide their attention between the “micro” and the “macro” when approaching the world.  
Holism, in the context of IKs, should not be approached as the inversion of MW 
reductionism (which perhaps explains why this is the only “broad consideration” to question its 
own inclusion). For example, if the terms “micro” and “macro” must be used in reference to IKs, 
then it is my recommendation that they be understood as part of a continuum that is never at any 
time either exclusively microscopic or exclusively macroscopic in focus. Rather, Indigenous 
knowledges should be approached as holistic because they draw upon an open and continuous 
binary ontology. For example, Indigenous knowledges express the nature/culture binary as open 
and continuous, which is exemplified in the ecocentrism of Indigenous thought as well as in the 
concept of place (as explained in the section, “Multicultural Science in the Internal Neocolonial 
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Context of Canada,” in chapter two). In other words, holism in the context of IKs should not be 
understood according to a dichotomous binary (i.e., holism as the inversion of reductionism; 
reductionism as the inversion of holism).  
Furthermore, it should be noted that the matter of vacillating between macro and micro 
levels of understanding in modern science is as much a matter of pedagogy as it is epistemology. 
For example, a Russian science educator I once knew was fond of telling me (and the rest of his 
students), that Russian school science first focuses on understanding general concepts and then 
incorporates more specific concepts, while North American school science begins with specific 
concepts and then moves to more general concepts. In other words, Russian science pedagogy 
provides a better example of a “holistic” perspective as Science 10 uses the term, by “focus[ing] 
on understanding concepts at a macro level, and then looking for specific examples that 
incorporate that knowledge” (SK Learning, 2005, p. 6). 
Typically, MWS organizes the micro and the macro levels of understanding in a linear 
order of magnitudes, or levels, roughly ranging from the atomic to the galactic. These levels are 
then fragmented according to their respective disciplines: chemistry, biology, geology, and 
physics (and their various hybrids). The “micro” level generally refers to those levels smaller in 
scale than an organism (e.g., human); from smallest to largest, this includes (but is not limited to) 
subatomic particles, atomic elements, and molecules, which are differentiated as either living 
(biotic; organic) or nonliving (abiotic; inorganic). The macro level generally refers to those 
levels larger in scale than an organism; from smallest to largest, this includes species, 
ecosystems, biosphere (planets), solar systems, galaxies, and the universe. An atom, for example, 
is a system of subatomic components—protons, neutrons, and electrons—bound by 
electromagnetic and gravitational forces. In another example, an ecosystem is a system of 
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organisms and inorganic matter that are interrelated in a food chain, governed by “laws of 
competition.” The point to be made is that the vacillation between macro levels and micro levels 
is typical of the systems perspectives of MWS.  
 Living/nonliving. A second dichotomous binary misapplied to IKs carves the world up 
into either living or non-living. As Science 10 explains, the sustainability of ecosystems is 
approached “from a systems perspective,” which defines a system as “a set of interrelated 
components” (p. 32). More specifically, “the living and nonliving components of a biological 
community and their interrelationships form an ecosystem” (p. 32). Non-living or abiotic 
components of an ecosystem include “sunlight, temperature, wind, water, and rock;” living or 
biotic components include “animals and plants” (p. 32). The following paragraph explains how 
Science 10 approaches the sustainability of ecosystems from a systems perspective: 
Students will document biodiversity as an indicator of the health of ecosystems and 
investigate the characteristics of population dynamics, within the context of the carrying 
capacity and limiting factors of ecosystems. This approach provides students with 
opportunities to explore the interdependence of species and the relationships between 
organisms and their physical environment. The study of the physical environment will 
include consideration of the large scale cycling of elements (carbon, nitrogen, and 
oxygen) in biogeochemical cycles and the bioaccumulation of toxins in food chains and 
food webs and the consequent effect on the sustainability of ecosystems. (p. 28) 
 
In other words, the various components of the ecological system—from atoms to species—are 
re-organized into such abstractions as biodiversity, population dynamics, food chains, 
biogeochemical cycles, and bioaccumulation of toxins.  
Indeed, the living/nonliving (biotic/abiotic) binary is prevalent throughout the Life 
Science: Sustainability of Ecosystems unit (p. 29, p. 30, p. 31, p. 32, p. 34, p. 36, p. 37, p. 38, p. 
39, p. 41). For example, the living/nonliving dichotomy is a focus of field trips: “The importance 
of the field trip cannot be understated as it provides students the opportunity to observe all of the 
interrelationships between biotic and abiotic factors of an ecosystem in a natural setting” (p. 32). 
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In the event that “a field trip is not feasible, students could view videos or pictures of particular 
ecosystems and identify examples of biotic and abiotic factors in those ecosystems” (p. 34). 
What is concerning, however, is this dichotomy is unproblematically extended to various 
“cultural worldviews” in general: “Students should explore the ways in which various cultures 
define their relationships with the Earth and all of its inhabitants – living and non-living” (p. 30). 
For example, Science 10 assumes that the living/nonliving (biotic/abiotic) binary applies to IKs 
when it that suggests that “students could compare scientific perspectives of the cyclical nature 
of matter and the interconnectedness of the biotic and abiotic factors in an ecosystem with 
Indigenous or other cultural worldviews” (p. 39). As Science 10 explains, “such a comparison 
helps to validate multiple perspectives or worldviews” (p. 39). However, as the literature review 
explains, IKs do not fragment reality into discrete categories of either living or nonliving. As a 
result, the assumption that such a comparison validates multiple worldviews (e.g., scientific and 
cultural/Indigenous) is doubtful.   
 Science/culture. The third dichotomy misapplied to IKs is the science/culture dichotomy 
(which the reader may recall from the dichotomous science/Indigenous binary system employed 
in the construction of IKs). Reiterating this dichotomy, Science 10 constructs “science” as 
separate from “cultural and intellectual traditions,” though it acknowledges their mutual “social 
context:” 
The history of science shows that scientific development takes place within a social 
context. Many examples can be used to show that cultural and intellectual traditions have 
influenced the focus and methodologies of science, and that science in turn has 
influenced the wider world of ideas. (p. 3) 
 
Furthermore, the guide explains that “the classroom experience for each student in Science 10 
should positively reflect […] not only the contributions to science from various cultures, but also 
the contexts and connections that it can have to all cultures” (p. 7). As we can see, Science 10 
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constructs “science” as distinct from but related (and relevant) to “culture.” Again, while the 
orientation of this dichotomy may not be problematic for MWS, it runs counter to IKs. 
The misapplication of the dichotomous science/culture binary to IKs operates to construct 
IKs as cultural “others” to science in two ways. First of all, IKs are constructed as “cultural” in 
the sense that they are defined as knowledge about Aboriginal peoples:  
It is an expectation that Indian and Métis content and perspectives be incorporated into all 
programs related to the education of kindergarten to grade 12 students in Saskatchewan, 
whether or not there are Indian and Métis students in a particular classroom. All students 
benefit from knowledge about the Indian and Métis peoples of Saskatchewan. It is 
through such knowledge that misconceptions and bias can be eliminated. (p. 6; emphasis 
added) 
 
It should be noted, however, that IK is not so much knowledge about Aboriginal people, but 
rather knowledge of Aboriginal people. Secondly, Science 10 constructs IKs as “cultural” when 
it writes, “inherent in these perspectives is […] a need to respect cultural values when exploring 
nature” (p. 6). Because “science” is not required to “respect cultural values” the reader can only 
assume that “science” is immune to such “cultural values.” The problem, here, is not that IKs are 
constructed as “cultural” knowledge because Indigenous knowledges cannot be separated from 
their cultures (clans, tribes, etc.); rather, the problem has to do with the identification of IKs as 
cultural when “science” is constructed as accultural. Furthermore, the idea of a science distinct 
from its culture rests upon the (MW) idea of objectivity. 
Implicit in the science/culture dichotomy is the assumption of one science, many cultures, 
of which Indigenous cultures are just one type. So we can say that the construction of “science” 
as accultural cannot help but construct IKs as other than science (or as unscientific) because IKs 
self-identify as cultural.  
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 Nature/culture. Lastly, the dichotomous nature/culture binary operates to construct 
“sustainability” as a feature of both “nature” and “culture,” understood as separate entities. This 
dichotomization, which is characteristic of modern thought, is misapplied to IKs. 
 The construction of sustainability as a feature or function of “nature” is evident when 
Science 10 refers to “the sustainability of ecosystems,” “the sustainability of our world,” and “the 
sustainability of our environment” (p. 28). As Science 10 explains, “nature has its own methods 
of maintaining limits on populations and keeping an ecosystem in balance” (p. 36). However, the 
construction of sustainability as a function of the natural world (alone) is problematic for the 
following reason. Most simply put, sustainability is a matter of (modern humans) learning to live 
within the carrying capacity of an ecosystem—whether that ecosystem is local or global. Even 
then, “sustainability” is a very recent phenomenon (crisis) in the history of the earth: in the 
absence of modern cultures, all plants and animals in general, and Indigenous peoples in 
particular, lived (and continue to live) sustainably, i.e., within the carrying capacities of their 
environments, and, for that reason, never encountered a “sustainability crisis.” So we can say that 
“sustainability” is a feature of modern culture/s and their inability to live sustainably, which 
brings us to the second part of the dichotomous construction of sustainability. 
 Constructed as a function of the human mind, Science 10 defines sustainability as “a 
paradigm or worldview that refers to the ability to meet the needs of the present generation 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs” (p. 29). According to 
Science 10, “a paradigm is the set of experiences, beliefs and values that constitute a way of 
viewing reality” (p. 30). Two points are worth noting with respect to the construction of 
sustainability as a paradigm or worldview (i.e., as a function of human culture). First, the 
paradigm is debated: 
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• “Some scientists believe that the human population may have grown beyond the 
Earth’s carrying capacity. Other scientists believe that advances in technology are 
able to increase the Earth’s carrying capacity” (p. 43). 
• “As of mid 2005, the world’s human population is growing at a rate of 200,000 new 
people each day. Is this sustainable given that there are essentially no new unoccupied 
lands for people to pioneer, as was true up until the 20th century?” (p. 43).  
 
As Science 10 explains, “scientific thought and knowledge can be used to support different 
positions. It is normal for scientists and technologists to disagree even though they may invoke 
the same scientific theories and data” (p. 30). Second, “sustainability” in Science 10 is 
constructed as a theory. To this end, students are expected to “explain changes in the scientific 
worldview (paradigm shift) of sustainability,” “select and integrate information from various 
human, print, and electronic sources (government publications, community resources, and 
personally collected data) with respect to sustainability and the environment,” and “communicate 
questions, ideas, and intentions, and receive, interpret, understand, support, and respond to the 
ideas of others with respect to sustainability and the environment” (p. 30). For example, 
“students are encouraged to develop an action plan that they or members of their community can 
undertake in order to maintain or enhance the sustainability of our environment at a local, 
regional, national, or international level” (p. 28). Note that students are “encouraged to develop” 
but not implement an “action plan.” The rationality behind approaching sustainability 
theoretically (i.e., as knowledge or information) seems to be that “as students develop these 
understandings, they are better able to make informed decisions that enhance the sustainability of 
our world” (p. 28). In this model, the (debated) theory of sustainability is emphasized over the 
practice of (enhancing) sustainability.  
 While the fragmentary construction of “sustainability,” is clearly constructed according 
to MW scientific presuppositions—as a function of the nature/culture dichotomy; as theory 
rather than practice—the point worth noting is that this construction of sustainability is assumed 
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to be commensurable with IKs. In one example, Science 10 recommends that students “explore 
the importance of the concepts of cycles, change, and stability (equilibrium) in ecosystems from 
scientific and cultural perspectives” (p. 38; emphasis added). In another example, “students 
could demonstrate their understanding of paradigm shifts and cultural perspectives by writing a 
story about an environmental issue from a cultural perspective or worldview different from their 
own” (p. 31). 
 What is more, the matter of (sub)cultural border-crossing (i.e., between scientific and 
cultural/Indigenous perspectives) is treated unproblematically. Science 10 explains the matter of 
crossing (sub)cultural borders:  
Some researchers believe that learning science requires many students to cross borders 
from the subcultures of their families and communities into the subculture of science and 
of school science (Aikenhead, 1996). Teachers can facilitate this border crossing by 
communicating with parents that school science includes more than the recitation of 
facts; rather, it requires active involvement by students in developing their own 
understanding of the natural world that respects personal cultural beliefs and scientific 
principles. (p. 7) 
 
This conception of (sub)cultural border-crossing fails to account for differences 
(incommensurabilities) between various scientific and cultural beliefs while at the same time 
reproduces the science/culture dichotomy. For example, Science 10 takes for granted that a 
student’s “understanding of the natural world” might not simultaneously respect “personal 
cultural beliefs and scientific principles,” leaving the student to deal with any 
incommensurabilities on his or her own. However, as the literature review demonstrates, 
(sub)culturally specific presuppositions do not necessarily cross (sub)cultural borders (and rarely 
do, by my estimation).  
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One of few examples that explicitly demonstrate the assumed commensurability of MWS 
(“science”) and IKs in Science 10 involves the paradigm of “sustainability” and the Indigenous 
“seven generations” philosophy. Science 10 reads: 
Sustainability is a way of understanding and interacting with the world that enables 
society to ‘meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’ (Our Common Future, United Nations, 1987). This 
representation of the paradigm of sustainability echoes the ‘seventh generation’ 
philosophy of some First Nations, which suggests leaders consider the effects of their 
actions on their descendants through the seventh generation in the future. (p. 30) 
 
However, this approach to “the paradigm of sustainability” is anthropocentric (human-centered) 
because only human needs are considered. Put differently, “descendants” (and therefore 
“family”) is considered in anthropocentric terms. Moreover, this anthropocentrism is extended to 
“the ‘seventh generation’ philosophy of some First Nations” in the recommendation that leaders 
consider the effects of their actions for the sake of their (human) descendants, or, alternatively, to 
meet the needs of the present without compromising our descendants’ ability to meet their 
(future) needs.  
 The “human-centredness” of this interpretation of the “seven generations” philosophy 
becomes more apparent when compared to Orel Lyons’ (1984) ecocentric explanation of the 
philosophy (which is therefore worth quoting at length): 
And each generation was to raise its chiefs and to look out for the welfare of the seventh 
generation to come. We were to understand the principles of living together. We were to 
protect the life that surrounds us, and we were to give what we had to the elders and to 
the children. The men were to provide, and the women were to care for the family and be 
the center, the heart of the home. And so our nation was built on the spiritual family, and 
we were given clans… the Turtle, the Eagle, the Beaver, the Wolf, the Bear, the Snipe, 
the Hawk, all of whom were symbols of freedom. Our brothers the Bears, the Wolves, 
and the Eagles are Indians; they are natives, as we are. We went to Geneva, the six 
nations, the great Lakota nation, as representatives of indigenous people of the western 
hemisphere, and what was the message that we gave? ‘There is a hue and a cry for human 
rights,’ they said, ‘for all people,’ and the indigenous people said, ‘What of the rights of 
the natural world? Where is the seat for the Buffalo or the Eagle? Who is representing 
them here in this forum? Who is speaking for the waters of the earth? Who is speaking 
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for the trees and the forests? Who is speaking for the Fish, for the Whales, for the 
Beavers, for our children? We are indigenous people to this land. We are like a 
conscience; we are small, but we are not a minority; we are the landholders, we are the 
land keepers; we are not a minority, for our brothers are all the natural world, and for we 
are by far the majority. It is no time to be afraid. There is no time for fear. It is only time 
to be strong, only a time to think of the future and to challenge the destruction of your 
grandchildren.’ (quoted in Cajete, 1994, p. 76) 
 
As this passage explains, every generation needs to look after the welfare of “all the natural 
world” (e.g., “the rights of the natural world”) which includes “the water of the earth” as well as 
“the life that surrounds us,” (e.g., the trees and the forests, the turtle, the eagle, the beaver, the 
wolf, the bear, the snipe, the hawk, the buffalo, the fish, the whales, etc.). In the Indigenous 
view, the cultural world is an indistinguishable part of the natural world. 
The analysis of the nature/culture binary demonstrates that the dichotomy is problematic 
to the inclusion of IKs not only because it constructs Indigenous knowledges as other than 
science, but also because the dichotomy is misunderstood to be a relevant conceptual category of 
IKs. Furthermore, the anthropocentrism inherent to the dichotomous binary can be demonstrated 
in the (MW) construction of sustainability and its assumed commensurability with IKs. This 
demonstrates two presuppositions with respect to the inclusion of IKs in Science 10: first, the 
inclusion rests upon the presupposition that “science” (constructed in the image of MWS) is 
distinct from but commensurable with IKs; second, the transition between “scientific” to 
“cultural” worldviews or perspectives is not a problematic process.  
In summary, this analysis has examined several discrete binaries more thoroughly in 
order to explore how they inform the inclusion of IK in Science 10. The dichotomies examined, 
which include reductionism/holism, living/nonliving, science/culture, and nature/culture, are all 
mistakenly assumed to apply to Indigenous knowledges and ways of knowing. In this way, the 
dichotomies operate to marginalize IKs on the basis of their irrelevance to IKs. Consider, for 
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example, the construction of the concept of sustainability according to the dichotomous 
nature/culture binary, as a feature of both ecosystems and the human mind. Interestingly, several 
of the misapplied binaries operate to explicitly dichotomize and therefore marginalize IKs. The 
reductionist/holist dichotomy operates to incorrectly construct IKs as the holistic inverse of 
reductionist science. The science/culture dichotomy (which rests upon the assumption that 
“science” can be separate from “culture”) operates to construct IKs as the cultural other to 
(objective) science. Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, the nature/culture dichotomy is 
examined in the construction of IKs as well as “sustainability.” The dichotomous nature/culture 
binary is drawn upon to construct IKs as cultural (an idea with which they self-identify) and 
“science” as accultural (in the image of MWS, which it is not, as critics have long since 
illustrated). The point to be made is that dichotomous binaries do not cross cultural borders into 
the domain of IKs. As the literature review explains, IKs emerge from and reflect an open and 
continuous binary ontology. As a result, these three dichotomies operate construct IKs as other 
than science, which is defined in exclusively MW terms. 
The misapplication of a dichotomous binary ontology to IKs reveals that Science 10 
constructs IKs in relation to science according to a paradox: IKs are constructed as being 
commensurable with but other than “science.” Science 10 is grievously wrong on both accounts. 
While it is correct to say that IKs are other than MWS because the two traditions rest upon 
fundamentally divergent presuppositions (that may be incommensurable), it is not correct to say 
that IKs are other than science because IKs are scientific (i.e., IKs are ecocentrically empirical 
and rational). That said, I believe that the paradoxical construction of IKs is significant because it 
demonstrates that IKs are misunderstood by virtue of their (mis)interpretation through MW 
lenses. 
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Discourse Analysis Summary 
This chapter takes up the inclusion of IKs in Science 10 in terms of the construction of concepts 
“science,” “scientific literacy,” and “Indigenous knowledge.” The focus of the DA is the 
construction of IKs in relation to “science” and “scientific literacy.”  
 The DA of Science 10 demonstrates that the concept of “science,” which is constructed as 
singular, rests upon several presuppositions characteristic of (academic) MWS. According to 
Science 10, the intention of science is to produce knowledge about the natural world, which is 
abstracted from the natural world (by the scientific-cultural world), in the context of the 
experimental laboratory. This model of science rests upon the dichotomous nature/culture binary, 
which presupposes that culture is separate from nature, which is characteristic of MWS, and 
which is not commensurable with IKs. As such, Science 10 constructs “science” in the exclusive 
image of MWS. 
 The concept of “scientific literacy” in Science 10 is taken up in terms of its definition and 
content. The DA reveals that “scientific literacy” is defined according to a dichotomous 
science/pseudoscience binary system based in MWS. Not surprisingly, scientific literacy is 
defined in terms in terms of (MW) scientists’ scientific literacy. To this end, four Foundational 
Statements delineate the concept of scientific literacy. The foundations include STSE, 
Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes; the first three of which correspond to the story, theory, and 
practice of MWS, while the fourth merely reinforces the first three. The DA of the content of 
scientific literacy reveals an emphasis on the measurements and measuring of the world, which 
reiterates and reproduces modern Western knowledge and ways of knowing (i.e., 
operationalism). Like the concept “science,” Science 10 constructs “scientific literacy” in the 
image of MWS. As a result of (1) the construction of scientific literacy in the image of MW 
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scientists’ scientific literacy in conjunction with (2) the construction of scientific literacy in 
relation to a dichotomous science/pseudoscience binary system, Science 10 creates a framework 
that cannot help but construct non-MW knowledges of the world as unscientific.  
The DA of the construction of “Indigenous knowledge and ways of knowing” reveals that 
IKs are constructed according to a paradox: IKs are constructed as commensurable with but other 
than “science,” which is constructed in the image of MWS. On the one hand, IKs are constructed 
according to a dichotomous scientific/Indigenous binary system that dissociates “scientific” from 
culture, while associating “scientific” with contemporary, civilized, reductionist, and ours and 
“Indigenous” with holist, cultural, and theirs. On the other hand, the content of the curriculum 
guide (i.e., the Key Concepts and the foundational and related learning objectives), which is 
based in MWS, is assumed to be commensurable with IKs. As the analysis of the construction of 
IKs in Science 10 demonstrates, the misapplication of dichotomous (MW) binaries to IKs 
operates to preclude the inclusion of IKs in two ways. First, the terms of the dichotomies that are 
applied to IKs position IKs as other that science, e.g., holistic (vs. reductionist), cultural (vs. 
objective), mythical (vs. factual), and so on. Second, IKs emerge from open and continuous 
binary ontologies and are therefore incommensurable with concepts that emerge from a 
dichotomous binary ontology, e.g., dichotomies such as micro/macro, living/nonliving, 
science/culture, and nature/culture. 
Whether IKs are dichotomized or misrepresented, the point to be made is that IKs are 
misunderstood. As the DA of the inclusion of IKs in Science 10 demonstrates, the 
commensurability of science (MWS) and IKs is taken for granted. In failing to adequately 
accommodate the incommensurabilities that define the space between IKs and MWS—two 
parallel knowledges of and ways of knowing the world—Science 10 precludes the inclusion of 
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IKs when “science” and “scientific literacy” are defined according to ethnocentric 
(MW/Eurocentric) philosophical presuppositions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
The Intentions of the Research 
Broadly speaking, this research aimed to identify and explore the problems inherent to the matter 
of multicultural (cross-cultural) science in order to better understand the nature of multicultural 
(cross-cultural) school science curriculum development. As the first example of science 
curriculum produced since Saskatchewan Learning has made explicit its commitment to the 
inclusion of IKs (Saskatchewan Learning, 2005b, p. 4), Science 10 (Saskatchewan Learning, 
2005a) offers itself as an indicator of the state of multicultural (science) curriculum development 
in the internal neocolonial context of Saskatchewan, Canada. As the curriculum guide explains, 
“the philosophy and spirit of science education in Saskatchewan is reflected in this curriculum, 
in the documents that support the new curriculum, and in materials designed and utilized for 
implementation” (p. 1). In an effort to understand the inclusivity of Science 10, this study 
examines the discursive construction of the concepts “science,” “scientific literacy,” and 
“Indigenous knowledge and ways of knowing” (also “Indian and Métis content and 
perspectives;” “Aboriginal content and perspectives”).  
 The literature review takes up four key issues inherent to the matter of multicultural 
science in the internal neocolonial context of Saskatchewan, Canada: internal neocolonialism, 
multicultural science, the ideology of preprofessional science training, and the Eurocentric 
illusion of benign translatability. The first two concepts are important because they inform the 
broader context of Science 10 (and the inclusion of IKs). The second concepts are important 
because they represent two significant barriers to the inclusion of IKs (in any curriculum). 
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 Tejeda, Espinoza, and Gutierrez’ (2003) theorization of internal neocolonialism is 
important because it draws attention to the cognitive and ideological forces that act through 
media such as curricula to (re)produce the imperial discourses that sustain the material 
domination, oppression, and exploitation of Indigenous peoples. Drawing on postcolonial studies 
of science (Harding, 1998; 2006; Cajete, 2000b; Knudtson & Suzuki, 2001) and cultural studies 
of science and science education (Aikenhead 2006; Hadi-Tabassum, 2001; Ogawa, 1995), 
“science” is defined as a culturally specific empirical and rational (systematic) knowledge of the 
world. Importantly, this conception of science (as multicultural) accommodates the 
incommensurabilities of MWS and IK, which I approach in terms of their divergent histories, 
politics, epistemologies, and ontologies. I suggest that IKs are more likely to support sustainable, 
ecocentric, practical, and inclusive practices, while MWS has tended to support practices that are 
unsustainable, anthropocentric (human-centred), abstract (theoretical), and dichotomous. 
Because of these differences, it can be difficult to approach IKs from a MW (Eurocentric) 
worldview.  
 In particular, the matter of multicultural (cross-cultural) school science is troubled by the 
ideology of preprofessional science training (Aikenhead, 2006, pp. 13-15) as well as the 
Eurocentric illusion of benign translatability (Battiste & Henderson, 2000, pp. 79-82). The 
ideology of preprofessional science training—the ideology that traditionally dominates school 
science—encourages students to enact MWS in the pursuit of becoming MW scientists. The 
Eurocentric illusion of benign translatability maintains that Eurocentric (modern Western) 
worldviews can be not only translated but also translated without substantial damage or 
distortion. In the context of (school) science, the Eurocentric illusion of benign translatability 
maintains that MWS is applicable across cultural borders. Both the ideology of preprofessional 
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science training and the Eurocentric illusion of benign translatability contradict the concept of 
multicultural science because they both rest upon the assumption that MWS is universal. 
The methodology of discourse analysis (DA) employed in this research is inspired by 
Kieran Egan’s (2005) paper Letting our presuppositions think for us. In his paper, Egan explains 
that because the claims we make rest on philosophical presuppositions, “it would be an absurd 
strategy to deal only with the claims and ignore the presuppositions because it may well be that 
our disagreements are at the level of presupposition,” which is “usually the case when it comes 
to arguments or decision-making about the curriculum” (p. 1). In the context of multicultural 
science curriculum development, I believe the concept of multicultural science is often rendered 
meaningless because the claims and presuppositions of otherwise parallel ethnosciences (e.g., 
MWS and IK) are mistakenly assumed to cross cultural borders.  
 The DA of Science 10 examines the inclusivity of the guide in terms of the discursive 
construction of the concepts of “science,” “scientific literacy,” and “Indigenous knowledge and 
ways of knowing.” More specifically, the construction of “Indigenous knowledge and ways of 
knowing” is examined in relation to the construction of “science” and “scientific literacy.” The 
three concepts are examined according to, first, the claims that construct them and, second, the 
presuppositions upon which the claims rest. From the findings of the research, the discourses 
drawn upon in the production of Science 10 (and the inclusion of IKs therein) will be identified. 
Implications 
The research findings demonstrate that Science 10 takes for granted the problem of multicultural 
(cross cultural) science curriculum development. In large part, this is because Science 10 
misunderstands IKs, which can be demonstrated in the assumption of cross-cultural 
translatability: IKs are incorrectly assumed to be commensurable with “science,” which is 
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constructed in the exclusive image of MWS. A significant part of the problem of multicultural or 
cross-cultural science has to do with the fact that IKs (in the context of academics) use many of 
the same terms as MWS (e.g., “science,” “nature,” “culture,” “holistic”) but with very different 
meanings. For example, IKs are “holistic” in the sense that they begin and end with the whole of 
creation, but not in the sense that they represent the inverse of reductionism. Similarly, IKs are 
“cultural” because the people hold the knowledge, and not because they fall short of the 
standards of objectivity (which is a distinctly Western ideal). As well, IKs can be described as 
“mythical” because storytelling plays a central role in connecting people to place, not because 
they are fictional. In short, IKs cannot be accurately described by the same dichotomous binary 
ontology that constructs MWS because IKs emerge from an entirely different (open and 
continuous) binary ontology. This would appear to indicate that Science 10 is guilty of the 
Eurocentric illusion of benign translatability. Most importantly, I believe that any attempt to 
understand IKs through such a dichotomous ontological framework will only result in cognitive 
imperialism and the continued marginalization of IKs. 
The fact that the curriculum guide constructs “science” and “scientific literacy” in the 
exclusive image of MWS reveals in Science 10 the presupposition that MWS is “science” (or, 
alternatively, that MWS is universal). The presupposition of one science (i.e., MWS) coupled 
with the fact of one world effectively allows for only one interpretation of the natural world. The 
assertion of one world, one interpretation, and one science reflects what Sandra Harding (2006) 
refers to as the unity of science thesis, which she explains as a set of three interrelated 
assumptions: 
According to the unity argument, there is one world, one and only one possible account 
of it, and one unique science that can capture that one truth most accurately reflecting 
nature’s own order. Less visible in most articulations of the unity thesis is a fourth 
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assumption: there is just one group of humans, one cultural model of the ideal human, to 
whom nature’s true order could become evident. (p. 121) 
  
Indeed, Science 10 recognizes many various cultures. And so, the fact of one world coupled with 
the assumption of one interpretation and one science of the world operates with the recognition 
of many cultures (“multiculturalism”), in conjunction with the science/pseudoscience and 
scientific/Indigenous binary system, to imply that modern cultures (vis-à-vis MWS) are the 
cultural model of the ideal human to whom nature’s true order could be become evident.  
 As this demonstrates, the unity of science thesis renders the concepts “multiculturalism” 
and “multicultural science” not just inert, but also complicit with cognitive imperialism! By 
comparison, a truly multicultural understanding of “science” would allow for multiple scientific 
interpretations of the world we share. The following recommendations, which are directed at 
policy makers, curriculum writers, and science teachers, are intended to address the 
misunderstanding of IKs from the perspective of modern Western (Eurocentric) worldviews, in 
general, and within the context of school science, in particular. 
 First, if MWS and IKs are to be understood as being commensurable, it is should be on 
the basis that both culturally-specific knowledges of the world are empirical (observation-based) 
and rational (systematic; logical; philosophical) according to their own standards. As a result of 
their respective cultural specificity (e.g., each knowledge tradition emerges from a different 
binary ontology), each expresses different (and sometimes incommensurable) facts, which are 
based in different (and sometimes incommensurable) rationalities. Put differently, in language 
consistent with the analysis of Science 10, MWS and IKs make different (and sometimes 
incommensurable) claims because MWS and IK rest upon different (and sometimes 
incommensurable) philosophical assumptions. 
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 Second, with the exception that MWS and IK are both scientific, little else between the 
two knowledge systems should be taken for granted as being commensurable. As such, the 
process of multicultural curriculum development should start from the premise that MWS and 
IKs are philosophically divergent. Acknowledging the incommensurability of MWS and IKs is 
recommended as a strategic attempt to deal with the Eurocentric illusion of benign translatability 
from the outset of curriculum development. Importantly, this is not to say that the two scientific 
traditions cannot arrive at the same conclusions (e.g., facts, theories) about the world. Rather, it 
is to say that MWS and IKs are unlikely to arrive at the same conclusions about the world 
because they are preoccupied with fundamentally different questions. For example, since its 
inception, MWS has been concerned with the question of what makes up the world, while IKs 
have, from the dawn of time, been concerned with the question of how to maintain the land, and 
all of the life that depends upon it. 
Since both knowledge types are scientific, both MWS and IKs should have a place in 
school science programs and curricula. However, the scientific content of each knowledge 
system is fundamentally different and therefore cannot be the basis for inclusion. Unless the 
fundamental incommensurability existing between Indigenous and modern sciences and their 
ontologies is first acknowledged, it is my opinion that the development of legitimately 
multicultural curricula will be impossible. Furthermore, I believe failure to acknowledge this 
fundamental incommensurability will advance the unity of science thesis and therefore render 
any attempt to develop multicultural curricula complicit with cognitive imperialism. Simply put, 
modern Western science provides an inadequate framework for multicultural (cross-cultural) 
curricula development because the categories upon which it draws are not broad enough to 
accept divergent knowledges of nature. 
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Instead, thematic content would provide a better bridge than scientific content between 
the two, which is culturally specific (and therefore cannot be translated without significant 
damage or distortion, as the misapplication of dichotomous binaries to IKs demonstrates). Two 
potential bridges already exist within Science 10, though they require expansion in order to 
meaningfully accommodate IKs and thus actualize authentically multicultural (cross-cultural) 
school science curricula. The concept of “sustainability” could be a potential bridge, if the 
sustainability unit in the guide (“Life Science: Sustainability of Ecosystems”) was understood to 
represent MWS in particular and not “science” in general. Indeed, as the literature review 
explains, IKs emerge from philosophies concerned with (not to mention histories that 
demonstrate) “sustainability.” If the Western ecological concept of “sustainability” represents the 
“modern” side of the bridge, the Indigenous concept of place represents the other side of the 
bridge. Understanding this bridge from a modern Western perspective requires a shift in thinking 
from land-as-object to land-as-relation. The STSE foundation, which focuses on the narrative 
aspect of “science,” could provide a second bridge, provided that it is expanded to include 
alternative cultural narratives, such as those narratives that inform IKs, which do not identify 
with the modern narrative of progress (development; civilization). More specifically, the concept 
of STSE would have to be expanded to include the concept of place. 
Though it is not addressed in Science 10, “food” provides another context that could 
simultaneously address MWS (e.g., the history and practice of chemical-industrial food) and IKs 
(e.g., a history of corn). Glen Aikenhead’s (2006) concept of “everyday science” provides 
perhaps another point of entry to the (potential) development of multicultural (cross-cultural) 
science programming and curricula. 
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All of these potential bridges are, of course, only suggestions for the integration of MWS 
and IKs within the same program or course. Taken together, they all try to make the same point: 
Unless the definition of “science” is expanded to be “multicultural” (as I attempt to do in the 
literature review), all efforts to include IKs with school science programs and curricula will be 
rendered ineffective and meaningless. My personal redefinition of “science” as multicultural is 
indebted to the twin projects of postcolonial studies, the simultaneous deconstruction of 
MW/Eurocentric thought (and relatedly, MWS) and the reconstruction of IKs. 
 In conclusion, in the interest of recognizing and including IKs within school 
programming in an internal neocolonial context, it is my recommendation that courses based in 
IKs should receive science credits in schools without necessarily having to follow the standard 
science curricula. In other words, IK (or Native science) courses should follow self-determined 
curricula. This is not to suggest against the development of multicultural or cross-cultural 
(science) curricula, but rather, to strongly advise caution with respect to the matter of integrating 
the two (differently) scientific traditions. 
 As the literature review explains, MWS and IKs are incommensurable in ways that 
inhibit understanding across cultural borders, and, as this research demonstrates, mandating IKs 
to follow the standard science curriculum constitutes cognitive imperialism and therefore 
reinscribes our neocolonial context. As such, it is also the recommendation of this research that 
the integration of IK and MWS within the same course or curriculum guide begin with 
acknowledging the incommensurability of MWS and IKs. Furthermore, the space between (or 
overlapping) MWS and IK needs to be further explored. In the event that the incommensurability 
of MWS and IKs is acknowledged, the meaningful integration of the two ethnosciences within 
the same course or curricular document may yet demand a structural separation of sorts, say, in 
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separate units or themes, or different objectives. Indeed, my own cross-cultural (multicultural) 
education consisted of courses that addressed MWS and IKs separately. Clearly, the matter of 
understanding and developing cross-cultural (multicultural) science programs and courses 
requires further research. Aikenhead and Mitchell (2011) provide such research in their book 
Bridging cultures: Indigenous and scientific ways of knowing nature, which examines the matter 
of preparing and implementing science curricula that recognize Indigenous knowledge as a 
foundational way of understanding the physical world. 
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